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TAKEOVER OF THE MEMORY FIELD: CHANGING COMMEMORATIVE 
PRACTISES REGARDING STALINIST REPRESSIONS IN RUSSIA 
 
Anastasiia Turusinova  
 
Abstract  
 
Current paper primarily focuses on the analyses of Russian memory regime on the issue 
of Stalinist repressions. Over the recent years, Russian government established a 
monopoly of commemoration of the past events by oppressing existing independent 
memory agent in the field. Current empirically driven case study aims to define modern 
memory regime in Russia and main reasons behind the takeover happened. With the help 
of framing analysis, the comparison of narratives used by state and non-state memory 
agents is done in order to distinguish key differences in how same commemorative events 
are framed by different actors. According to the analysis, in authoritarian settings 
independent memory agent Memorial is considered as a threat, as it emphasizes the 
connection between Soviet repressions and the ongoing ones in modern Russia. New 
state-controlled actor Memory Fund was introduced to the field in order to promote 
legitimacy of the incumbent regime and establish the monopoly of commemoration.  
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 Introduction  
Within the recent years in academia the concept of politics of memory gained 
popularity as a truly interdisciplinary subject. It became appealing for scientists from 
history, sociology, cultural studies and etc. (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014, p. 7) However, 
within the political science the concept remains to be not fully developed and loosely 
defined. (Wertsch & Roediger III, 2008, p. 318) Moreover, almost all existing studies 
refer to situation only in consolidated democracies. For instance, the most outstanding 
attempt to make a generalized theoretical framework ‘Theory of the Politics of Memory’ 
was done by Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard with the assumption that it could not be 
applied to non-democratic states. (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014) In this sense Russia as an 
example of authoritarian rule of law remains to be understudied. It especially concerns 
the sensitive issue of the recognition of Soviet crimes happened during the 1930-1940s 
under Stalin’s totalitarian regime. Repressions affected many Russian families that had 
to keep silence on the topic during the whole soviet era. 
Nevertheless, in 1987 within the Soviet Republics the bottom-driven process of 
commemoration of victims of political crimes began. Public association ‘Memorial’ has 
united different soviet regions in a movement aimed to investigate and spread out the 
information about the victims in camps.1 The organization continued its activity in 
unstable political situation in the 1990s and in 2000s under Putin’s growing autocracy. 
However, starting from 2007 Memorials’ activists began to face problems. After few 
arrests, searches by the police, forced emigration, lawsuits and scandals Memorial in 2016 
was listed as a "non-profit organizations performing the function of a foreign agent" by 
the Ministry of justice of the Russian Federation.2 After 2013 many independent NGOs 
                                                        
1 Chronology of establishment of Memorials’ centres: 1987 – Moscow; 1988 – Krasnoyarsk, Khibiny, 
Novosibirsk, Kharkiv, Omsk, Voronezh, Ukhta, Tomsk, Perm, Kazakhstan, Chistopol, Yagodninsk; 1989 
– Pskov, Nizhnetagilsk, Donetsk, Khabarovsk, Syktyvkar, Mariupol, Abez, Lviv, Pechora, Magadan, 
Odessa, Astrakhan, Tula, Chelyabinsk, Inta, Norilsk, Bratsk, Biysk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Crimea, Riga, 
Ryazan. (Source official website of ‘Memorial’ URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/history/).  
2 By the problems I mainly mean the following cases: 24 Nov 2007 – Attack in Ingushetia on a member of 
the human Rights center "Memorial" Oleg Orlov and journalists; 4 Dec 2008 – Search in ‘Memorial’ (St. 
Petersburg); July 15 2009 – The murder of an employee of Memorial in Grozny Natalia Estemirova. Forced 
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started being oppressed by the regime and Memorial was not exception to the rule. This 
verdict is crucial as it creates many obstacles for the further organization’s functioning.  
Meanwhile in 2015 Dmitry Medvedev signed an official ‘Concept of state policy 
to perpetuate the memory of victims of political repression’ that was approved by the 
government.3 It claims the following:  
“Russia cannot fully become a state governed by the rule of law and 
take a leading role in the international community without perpetuating 
the memory of many millions of its citizens who have become victims of 
political repression.” 4 
Within the framework of the Concept in 2016 the organization ‘Memory fund’ 
was established. Same as Memorial it aims to commemorate victims of political 
repression under the Soviet rule. Memory Fund does that by supporting educational and 
research activities in the field, creating memorials and museums all over the country.5 
According to articles of association the financial sources are private and corporate 
donations.6 If one looks at its board that actually manages the Fund, it becomes clear that 
the board consists of people somehow connected to current government. For instance, the 
                                                        
emigration of several employees of the Grozny Memorial. The office has been suspended for six months; 
2009-2011 – Trial of Oleg Orlov & Ramzan Kadyrov; 9 January 2018 – On trumped up charges arrested 
the head of the office of the human Rights center ‘Memorial’ in Grozny Oyub Titiev; 17 Jan. 2018 – The 
Ingush office of the human Rights center ‘Memorial’ was set on fire in Nazran. (Source official website of 
‘Memorial’ URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/history/); 
Official website of International historical, educational, charitable and human rights society ‘Memorial’: 
“Proceedings on the status of a foreign agent are ongoing” URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-
ru/memorial/departments/intermemorial/news/22.  
3 Official website of ‘The presidential Council of the Russian Federation on civil society and human rights 
development’ URL: http://www.president-sovet.ru/documents/read/393/.  
4 «Россия не может в полной мере стать правовым государством и занять ведущую роль в мировом 
сообществе, не увековечив память многих миллионов своих граждан, ставших жертвами 
политических репрессий.» (Sourse: Official website of ‘The presidential Council of the Russian 
Federation on civil society and human rights development’). 
5 Official website of Fund “Perpetuating the memory of victims of political repression”, or Memory Fond 
URL: http://memoryfund.ru/о-фонде/. 
6 Official articles of association of the Fund “Perpetuating the memory of victims of political repression” 
URL: http://memoryfund.ru/wp-content/uploads/Устав%20Фонда%20памяти.pdf.  
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chairman of the board is Advisor to the President of the Russian Federation Mikhail 
Fedotov.7  
The first project of the Memorial Fund was the creation of a national memorial of 
the victims of political repressions “Wall of Sorrow” (“Стена Скорби”) in Moscow. 
The project was implemented in accordance with the decree of Vladimir Putin on public 
funds and national donations. In 2017 the president took part in opening ceremony of the 
memorial and gave a speech that contained the following:  
“[…] Yes, we and our descendants need to remember the tragedy of 
repression, the reasons that gave rise to them. But that does not mean 
‘settling scores’. It is impossible to push society back to the dangerous 
line of confrontation. It is now important for all of us to build on the 
values of trust and stability. […]” 8  
The use of the ‘stability’ narrative by Vladimir Putin that emphasizes the main 
advantage of current regime brought my interest to an issue. Within last ten years, Russian 
government managed to establish a monopoly of the commemoration by oppressing one 
of the key actors in the field – independent NGO Memorial. Although both newly 
established Memory Fund and old Memorial have the same aims and activities, one is 
being persecuted when another receives the government support. Why the takeover of 
mnemonic space happened in Russia and what are the reasons behind that?  
Therefore, the research problem this study addresses comes from empirical case: 
one independent memory agent was replaced by a government controlled one. The aim 
of this study is to give a characteristic of current memory regime in Russia concerning 
the Stalinist repressions by mapping out the differences between memory agents in the 
field. I suggest that mentioned memory agents tend to use different narrative concerning 
                                                        
7 Other participants of the Fund’s board: Vladimir Lukin, a member of the Federation Council; Sergey 
Karaganov, honorary Chairman of the Presidium of the Council for foreign and defense policy. (Source: 
Official website of Memory Fond URL: http://memoryfund.ru/о-фонде/).  
8 “[…] Да, нам и нашим потомкам надо помнить о трагедии репрессий, о тех причинах, которые их 
породили. Но это не значит – призывать к сведению счетов. Нельзя снова подталкивать общество к 
опасной черте противостояния. Сейчас важно для всех нас опираться на ценности доверия и 
стабильности.[…]”;  
Official website of the administration of the President of Russia: ‘Opening of the memorial to victims of 
political repression “Wall of Sorrow” ’ URL: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55948.  
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the commemoration of repressions and one of them is in a way undermining Putin’s 
regime. In order to identify possible differences in the narratives produced by two 
organisations in order to shape particular collective memory, the framing analysis is going 
to be used.  
In order to define the notion of collective memory, I’m using one of the most 
common approaches established by Aleida Assmann, who differentiated four types of 
memory. According to her, on the one hand there is individual memory that reflects one’s 
personal experience and knowledge, but on the other – there also is a collective memory. 
This type of memory refers to common understanding of different historical events that 
is shared within a nation/society. There are different channels within which it could be 
formed: literature, art, films, media and etc. As a result, citizens of one or another country 
usually share same opinion on the events that took place in the past and are related to their 
state’s history. (Assmann, 2002)  
Aleida Assmann also introduced the definition of political memory, according to 
her this is a socially constructed collective memory that is ‘emplotted in a narrative that 
is emotionally charged and conveys a clear and invigorating message’. It is also important 
that political memory tend to have material and visual signs, e.g. monuments or sites, as 
well as some kind of performative action that implies collective participation. This is the 
way the political memory has a chance to be ‘transmitted from generation to generation’. 
(Assmann, 2002, p. 11) Heiko Pääbo defines political memory as “the collective memory 
that is functioning according to the needs and demands of power relations”, as political 
memory tends to serve particular political aims and interests of political elites. (Pääbo, 
2011, p. 24) 
Another relevant to current study theoretical concept is memory regime. This 
notion combines two previous components and refers to them on a national level. In other 
words, it is a combination of political memory practices in the country that could be 
defined as a general line of common discourse and state’s behavior. Memory regime 
defines what is ‘allowed’ to be said, by whom and to what extent. 
Concerning the structure of current study, in the first chapter the literature 
review will be done. As the concept of memory politics remains debatable in academia 
as well as common theoretical framework, my study will generalize existing arguments 
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of the main authors in the field. For instance: Aleida Assmann, Jeffrey K. Olick, James 
V. Wertsch & Henry L. Roediger III, Christoffer Leiding Kølvraa, Jan Kubik & Michael 
Bernhard, Jay Winter, Barbara A. Misztal and others. This chapter aims to come up with 
clear theoretical argument that will be proved later in empirical part of the study. 
The second chapter will introduce the analysis of current situation in the case of 
modern Russia. There are two NGOs active in the field of memory politics in Russia.9 
Within this research I will have a look on what are the key activities of the existing NGOs 
in the field, what is the history of their development and what is the nature of the 
narratives that they use. 
In the next third chapter of the current study I outline used methodology and 
provide practical steps on how analysis will be implemented. Framing analysis will help 
me to distinguish main messages and narratives that are used by both actors in the 
mnemonic field. This comparison enables to understand why the government has shown 
interest to take control over the mnemonic space. The chapter also elaborates on selection 
of data for the analysis and timeframe of the current research. Materials for the analysis 
could be found on the open sources: websites of the mentioned NGOs where they share 
their key events and activities, as well as other news portals that did publications 
concerning selected commemorative events.10 Two important events in Russian memory 
politics concerning Stalinist repressions are used for the analysis: Days of remembrance 
in Sandarmokh, Krasny Bor and Solovki (August 4-5) and National day of remembrance 
for victims of political repression (October 29-30). Memorial and Memory Fund have 
different commemorative activities on that days, which will be analysed within last two 
years (2016-2018), since Memory Fund was founded.  
Last chapter of the research paper focuses on the empirical analysis and explains 
the results by giving a characteristic of the features of frames produced by both actors. It 
proceeds with the discussion on nature of establishment of the monopoly on 
                                                        
9 (1) Fund “Perpetuating the memory of victims of political repression”, or Memory Fond URL: 
http://memoryfund.ru/о-фонде/; and (2) ‘Memorial’ - International historical, educational, charitable and 
human rights society URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/memorial-international-aims/.  
10 Memory Fond URL: http://memoryfund.ru/все-новости/; Memorial – URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-
ru/events/calendar#list.  
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commemoration that took place in Russian mnemonic field within the Putin’s presidency. 
All in all, current study aims to give characteristic of current Russian memory regime 
concerning the Stalinist repressions and map out main differences in the narrative that 
memory agents have.  
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1. Theory of Politics of Memory 
The current chapter of the research is mainly a theoretical background with the literature 
review in the field of memory regimes and non-democratic political environment. It aims 
to structure and collect main arguments and theoretical developments that currently exist 
in academia. By the end of the chapter a clear theoretical framework and argument is 
developed to be further tested in empirical part of the current study. 
1.1 The concept of memory regime 
Current subchapter is fully dedicated to the understanding of the notion of 
memory regime. It aims to highlight the key components that define the regime. Starting 
with the theoretical framework ‘Theory of the Politics of Memory’ by Jan Kubik and 
Michael Bernhard and ending up with arguments of other authors and critics to the theory, 
which would help to provide a new definition that is going to be used within the study.  
In order to understand the notion of memory regime, it is important to firstly 
define what is a collective memory. When we think about the concept of collective 
memory, it is always crucial to keep in mind that memories never exist in a vacuum. In 
order to define the notion of collective memory, I’m using one of the most common 
approaches established by Aleida Assmann, who differentiated four types of memory. 
According to her, on the one hand there is individual memory that reflects one’s personal 
experience and knowledge, but on the other – there also is a collective memory. This type 
of memory refers to common understanding of different historical events that is shared 
within a nation/society. There are different channels within which it could be formed: 
literature, art, films, media and etc. As a result, citizens of one or another country usually 
share same opinion on the events that took place in the past and are related to their state’s 
history. (Assmann, 2002)  
The process of collective memory formation is a complex one, involving many 
actors, experiences, narratives and discourses that eventually lead to a certain outcome. 
The environment in which the memories are being formed is one of the key components 
in the process. In academia there were many attempts to approach the study of this 
environment. Researchers tried to address the questions of how the environment shapes 
the collective memories, who is involved in this process and how does the formation 
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happen. Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard have become the ones to provide a generalized 
theory to answer mentioned questions.  
So how do authors define the concept of memory regime within the framework? 
They describe it as “a set of cultural and institutional practices that are designed to 
publicly commemorate and/or remember a single event or set of events, or a 
distinguishable past process”. (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014, p. 14) Authors also introduce 
different regime types. The first one received a name fractured. According to authors, it 
has a specific ‘memory issue’ and a sharp line that actors intend to make. Thus, in 
fractured regimes there usually is a division in a mnemonic field, when there are authors 
of ‘true’ version of the past and a simply ‘false’ one that tend to be in opposition. Another 
regime type is called pillarized, according to which actors accept the existence of different 
opinions over the past, but stock to one of them on the official level. In other words, this 
regime type allows actors to have different interpretations of the past, resulting in 
disagreements and memory conflicts between the actors. The third regime type is called 
unified and it tends to exist without politicized past and is free of mnemonic based 
conflicts. Actors in current regime understand the danger of politicizing the past and try 
to escape it or simply do not see any point in bringing up issues from the past. (Kubik & 
Bernhard, 2014, pp. 17-19) 
One important limitation of the framework that one should take into account if 
applying the model over empirical case studies is that it works only with democratic 
political regimes. It was a conscious choice authors made as they argue that ‘dynamics of 
mnemonic contests’ are expected to be different in non-democratic regimes. (Kubik & 
Bernhard, 2014, p. 19) Thus, the framework could not be fully applied to the Russian 
case, as according to recent developments in academia, Russia did not complete a 
successful democratic transit and is currently considered as an electoral authoritarianism. 
(Gel'man, 2015) 
Another important restriction of the theory concerns the fact that each memory 
regime assumes only one collective memory on a certain issue within a given moment or 
period. In other words, the model cannot be used to give a characteristic to a certain state 
in general, but for a given timeframe and one particular issue. Authors also introduce the 
notion of ‘mnemonic field’, or ‘the field of memory’ that is considered to be an ensemble 
of memory regimes. Current restriction seems to be fair, as same actors can have different 
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positions over the different issues and as well as there could be a varying degree of 
salience over the issues and both of them could change over time. (Kubik & Bernhard, 
2014, pp. 17-18) 
However, the term of memory regime picked up by authors could be a bit 
confusing. Eva-Clarita Pettai sees a clear problem with using it, as the notion ‘regime’ is 
considered to represent “a set of principles, norms and rules that fundamentally regulate 
the interaction of actors in a given field of activity (usually of government)”. (Pettai, 
2016, p. 175) Thus, within Kubik’s and Bernhard’s theory the term seems to lack some 
expected degree of institutionalization, authors on the contrary emphasize its fluidity that 
happens due to always changing composition of actors and/or ‘dynamics of their 
preferences’. This leads to the situation when different memory regimes can co-exist at 
the same period of time referring to different historical events. As Eva-Clarita Pettai 
argues, that gives a theory not actor-centered, but the event-centered focus, which could 
distort the whole picture. (Pettai, 2016, p. 175)  
Hungarian researcher Iván Z. Dénes in his study agrees with Eva-Clarita in a way 
that he defines regimes of memory as an “institutionalized ways of setting and managing 
the supply and demand of remembrance in historical contexts”. Thus, his concept 
supposes governance of the historical remembrance issues, when the discourse about the 
past is mainly produced by the state, its institutions and other political actors. However, 
the discourses are supposed to be recognized and accepted by the general public, the same 
way as it is in Jan Kubik’s and Michael Bernhard’s theory. Iván Z. Dénes even gives this 
process a classical economic term ‘the supply and demand’ of memory. (Dénes, 2013, p. 
466) Mark A. Wolfgram goes further and introduces the notion of ‘the memory-market’, 
which he understands as an arena for competing collective memories, that is more open 
in democratic societies, but more governmentally regulated under authoritarian rule of 
law. (Wolfgram, 2014, pp. 19-20) 
Thus, interesting aspect that I noticed doing the literature review is that there is a 
lack of agreement on the definition of memory regime within academia. Authors actively 
use the term but define it differently and not according to the Jan Kubik’s and Michael 
Bernhard’s framework. For instance, Evelyn Goh studies memory discourses in Post-
Cold War East Asia and uses memory regime definition from the Eric Langenbacher’s 
works. It is defined as “a structure of social meaning that surrounds collective memory, 
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constituted by discursive and power relationships, and which develops over time 
institutionalized practices”. According to Goh and Langenbacher, a collective memory 
regime is an outcome of political actor’s negotiations that is later translated to the public. 
(Goh, 2013, p. 165) In Eric Langenbacher’s article dedicated to the changing memory 
regimes in contemporary Germany, the notion of memory regime is used more in a sense 
of competing memory. Author reasons the appearance of the ‘Holocaust-centered 
memory’ and actors that were representing this collective memory and refer to that as 
‘establishment of new memory regime’ that was competing with the ‘dominant memory 
regime’ that was already existing in the country. (Langenbacher, 2003) If one looks at the 
situation through the prism of Jan Kubik’s and Michael Bernhard’s theory, it will become 
clear that those are not regimes, but mnemonic warriors that are competing within one 
memory regime in Germany at that time.  
Another example of different memory regime typology that seems to be more 
suitable for our case was introduced by Jay Winter. He considers memory regime to be 
more substantial and durable, as he defines it as “ways groups of people frame their 
understanding of the past”. (Winter, War beyond Words, 2017, p. 122) He tends to 
connect them with Aleida Assmann’s concept of cultural memory, as in this 
understanding of memory regime, it goes beyond direct experience that people lived 
through. In other words, it is an imagined experience that was part of the life of older 
generations. According to Jan Assmann, cultural memory is especially important for the 
process of identity formation as it maintains and preserves particular cultural meanings 
for one or another society. They are objectivised and institutionalised to be transformed 
to the future generations. (Pääbo, 2011, p. 23) A memory regime in this case is set of 
narratives that is used to characterise the past and put it into the present. (Winter, 2019, 
p. 256) Author suggests his own framework of typology of the regimes which is based on 
who is responsible for the ‘hurtful’ historical events. For example, in case when 
“narratives disclose sacred presence in history”, the memory regime is called sacred. 
When particular group (e.g. Jews, freemasons, gypsies and etc.) is targeted as powerful 
and responsible for the suffering, the regime is demonic. The secular memory regime, on 
the contrary, does not blame anyone or any power for initiating the course of events. 
(Winter, 2016, pp. 221-222) I would like to develop this thought further and include 
identification of the ‘victim’, or in other words who was oppressed as a result of particular 
historical events. To my understanding, this identification of the roles helps to view the 
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full picture and to dot the i’s and cross the t’s. As a result, if one wants to define a memory 
regime within the framework of Winter’s approach, special focus on who is responsible 
for the historical events is needed and who is viewed as a victim.  
In the light of competing understandings of the concept of memory regime, a 
logical question that arise is which definition to use and how to define memory regime in 
the research? For the purpose of current study, the decision was done not to focus on the 
framework of Kubik and Bernhard as it is not suitable for non-democratic regimes. This 
limitation does not allow to fully apply the framework over the Russian case, as it simply 
could not be put under one of the defined by authors regime’s categories. Due to that 
within the current paper, the concept of memory regime was taken from Jay Winter’s 
theory and developed further, taking into account developments of other authors.  
However, one important theoretical development from the model provided by Jan 
Kubik and Michael Bernhard will be used to conceptualize memory regime for the 
purposes of my study. The model provides an actor-centered approach, assuming that it 
is actor who is able to shape the regime. I will continue moving in the same paradigm of 
thinking, focusing on main actors in the mnemonic field to characterise Russian case. 
However, the emphasis would be also done on the institutionalised practices related to 
the topic, or in other words, what commemorative acts and events exist in the field. This 
aspect comes from Evelyn Goh’s and Eric Langenbacher’s understanding of memory 
regime and also correlates with works of other authors. The last element of the developed 
definition comes from Jay Winter and focuses on popular narrative and who is viewed as 
the one responsible for the crimes and as an oppressed victim. Thus, I define a memory 
regime as a set of institutionalised practises that are initiated by memory actors to 
commemorate particular history through a certain narrative (where there are particular 
victims and responsible for the crimes perpetrators). Taking into account arguments of 
scholars it could be said that in order to give a characteristic of a given memory regime, 
one has to pay attention to not only memory actors in the field, but existing 
institutionalised practises and narrative that is used by actors.  
In the case of current study, through the analysis of and special focus on 
mentioned elements, it will be possible to give a full characteristic of the Russian memory 
regime. The next subchapter has an emphasis on one of the crucial components of the 
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memory regime – memory agent. The precise definition that is used within the current 
study will be outlined, as well as existing typology of the actors. 
1.2 Memory agent as a key notion in a memory regime  
This subchapter has a clear focus on the notion of memory agent and its place in the 
concept of memory regime. In addition to characterization of the notion it aims to 
highlight difference between state and non-state memory agents.  
Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard provide us with an actor-centred, or 
instrumentalist view on how the historical memory is developed. (Kubik & Bernhard, 
2014, p. 10) This approach assumes that actor is a key figure in the memory formation 
process. Within the framework of the theory, authors call them mnemonic actors, or 
entrepreneurs and characterize as family members, teachers, professors, artists, 
intellectuals, journalists, priests and etc. In other words, those are people that may have a 
certain influence on a person’s life in its different stages. Actors use various instruments 
to approach the ‘history’ – which is considered to be a set of discourses about the past 
that is produced by actors and is validated by public. (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014, p. 10) 
However, authors make it clear that they take into account mostly politically motivated 
actors that are involved in power struggle and seek legitimization for their efforts. (Kubik 
& Bernhard, 2014, p. 17) This theoretical aspect reminds me another theory that focuses 
on explanation of any political changes that happen in a given state. I refer to Multiple 
Streams Framework proposed by John Kingdon (Kingdon, 2003) and later developed by 
Nikolaos Zahariadis (Zahariadis, 2007), according to which ‘political entrepreneurs’ are 
the ones who have power to set a political agenda. In a same way as it is in Kubik’s and 
Bernhard’s theory, entrepreneurs are able to pay public’s attention to given issues, that 
for some reasons serve their political interests. Mnemonic actors in a same as political 
entrepreneur’s way could be represented not only by individuals, but also by institutions, 
political parties, NGOs, groups of people and etc.  
 If we refer to other studies in academia, the concept of memory agent is defined 
as internal and external to state actors that aim to establish the ‘truth’ on what happened 
during traumatic periods in the past. Agents “seek to honour victims and identify 
perpetrators” and are usually involved in ‘memory battles’ with each other. Competing 
agents tend to propose different narratives or silencing certain discussions about the past. 
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Thus, memory agents want to set up a relationship between the understanding of the past 
that they consider as the ‘right’ one and nation-building process taking place within a 
state. (Budryte, 2010, p. 331) 
 Agents of memory tend to relate themselves to socially and politically active 
groups, who could be opposing to incumbent regime or supporting it. Actors usually 
promote their own version of the past and are especially active in the field in case their 
position differs from the one supported by a state. The main reason behind agents being 
involved in social and political activism is considered to be their aim to “obtain greater 
currency for their version of memory”. (Budryte, 2010, p. 334) However, it is important 
to keep in mind that author here is thinking in a paradigm of democratic political regimes, 
when political life and freedom within a state are usually not limited. For the purposes of 
this study, provided definition of memory agent is going to be adjusted according to the 
realities of Russian state.  
Jan Kubik and Michael Bernhard have also introduced different types of 
mnemonic actors, according to strategies they tend to use. Each mnemonic entrepreneur 
tends to choose particular behavioural strategy, or in other words, “engages in specific 
practices”. (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014, p. 12) The first type is called mnemonic warriors 
and represents actors who tend to emphasize a sharp distinction between their own 
‘correct’ narrative and the one that ‘others’ have that is considered to be a wrong one. 
Current actors usually base social and political life on a ‘non-negotiable historical truth’. 
The next type of entrepreneurs is on the contrary acknowledging the existence of 
alternative opinions concerning the past events and is called mnemonic pluralists. 
Although, they are open for a dialog, the ‘right’ opinion anyway belongs to them. 
Following type of mnemonic abnegators represent actors that are fully aware of the past 
but made a conscious choice to avoid it. They take off the questions of political memory 
from the agenda, due to not seeing any benefits for bringing it up. The last type of 
mnemonic prospectives includes actors that do not usually use collective memory as an 
instrument in power struggle. As well as mnemonic abnegators, prospectives are fully 
aware about the past, but see no ground for putting it into the agenda. (Kubik & Bernhard, 
2014, pp. 13-15) 
Within Jan Kubik’s and Michael Bernhard’s framework, mnemonic actors define 
a memory regime themselves that exists in three types that were explained in previous 
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subchapter: fractured, pillarized or unified regime. It is easy to make a conclusion that 
first regime type is filled with mnemonic warriors as the main actors. And other types of 
regimes are without warriors and are usually either pillarized or unified which depends 
on the balance between abnegators and pluralists. 
Authors mention that types are ideal emphasizing that they are theoretical and 
most likely differ while applied to empirical cases. (Kubik & Bernhard, 2014, p. 12) In 
the case of current study, this limitation is especially relevant, as non-democratic nature 
of Russian politics does not allow to fully use existing theoretical developments. Due to 
the fact that typology of the memory regimes provided by the authors is not fully 
applicable to Russian case, Jan Kubik’s and Michael Bernhard’s understanding of 
memory agents could not be completely used as well. I aim to emphasize the importance 
of non-democratic political environment and develop a concept that is applicable and 
relevant for Russian case. In order to do that, arguments and theoretical developments of 
other authors will be used to produce a more precise conceptualization.  
For instance, Eva-Clarita Pettai has found confusing the narrow focus of the 
theory on those mnemonic actors that are in power, or in other words, “authorities and 
major political actors as parties”. According to author, given term can be too narrow if 
one studies public commemorative events that by its definition engages with wider 
community. (Pettai, 2016, p. 176) In this light, to give a full characteristic of a memory 
regime, it is important to look outside the frames of actors in power.  
Matthew Cook and Micheline van Riemsdijk in their study on Holocaust 
memoralization process in Berlin also emphasize the importance of paying attention not 
only to state-driven initiatives. Authors argue that state-centric view on remembering of 
certain events in the past is outdated and encourage scholars to pay attention to 
independent ‘memorialization agents’: political actors, NGOs, tourists and heritage 
institutions. (Cook & van Riemsdijk, 2014, p. 141) 
Thus, it is important to consider the difference between state and non-state 
memory agents. The agents might have different aims and behavioral strategies according 
to their origin. For instance, state agents might be more involved in nation-building 
process, which aim to legitimize the incumbent regime. When non-state actor, on the 
opposite might invest in finding the ‘truth’ behind historical events. Within the current 
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research, the emphasis will be done on both of them. State-driven agents might have more 
resources and support compared to non-state memory actors. The influence of last ones 
could be also limited in non-democratic regimes, especially in case of disapproval of 
official governmental position on a past. That is why the focus of the following 
subchapter is done on features of non-democratic political regimes. This theoretical 
background will allow us to proceed with conceptualisation of the term of memory agent 
relevant for the context of non-democratic settings. 
1.3 Limited political life in non-democracies  
Current subchapter aims to point out differences that memory agents in 
democratic regimes and memory actors in non-democratic ones might have. The 
subchapter firstly provides an overview of the notions of democratic and non-democratic 
regimes. 
In general, democracy as a concept has many issues. The term is broad and there 
is lack of agreement among the scholars on its definition. It is also impossible to 
determine each country on the globe either to be ‘white’ or ‘black’, democratic or non-
democratic. That is why today scholars define wide range of different non-democratic 
rules of law: authoritarian regimes, electoral authoritarianisms, failed states and etc.  
Authoritarian regimes are considered to be those who made a transition attempt 
to the democratic rule, but for some reason had stocked in so-called ‘grey zone’ on their 
way. (Carothers, 2002, p. 5) Countries under authoritarian rule simulate democratic 
regime by facade institutions, while in fact that is incumbent government who controls 
the freedoms and allowable plurality in the country. According to Paul Brooker, all non-
democratic regimes share common characteristic which refers to broad use of “censorship 
and repression to maintain authority and to implement unpopular policies”. (Brooker, 
2008, p. 133) 
Nevertheless, within Russian political academia there have been made an attempt 
to find out whether it was comparatively easy for Kremlin to implement unpopular social 
policy reforms at the beginning of the 2000s within authoritarian rule. According to 
Vladimir Gel’man and Andrey Starodubtsev the answer to the question is more of a ‘no’ 
– reforms proved themselves to be unsuccessful and lead authors to the conclusion that 
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even within authoritarian regime government seeks legitimization and is not able to 
implement whatever it wants without looking back on citizen’s opinion. (Gel'man & 
Starodubtsev, 2016) The same point is made by Andreas Schedler in his “The Politics of 
Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism”, arguing that in fact 
authoritarian rulers can never afford themselves to “lean back and relax”. (Schedler, 2013, 
p. 22)  
Paul Brooker argues that authoritarian regime concept lacks in precision and 
provides us with his own view on classification within authority rule. Based on Aristotle's 
ideas of rule by 'one, few or many' that helps to follow the paths of power distribution, 
Brooker adds it up with three additional questions: why the incumbent rules; how he rules; 
what happens to him, in other words, what the probable pathways of democratization are. 
Answering them one by one, researcher would be able to define more precise type of 
authoritarian rule in one particular country. (Brooker, 2008) 
For instance, electoral authoritarianism, which is slightly different to the existing 
authoritarian regimes concept. The main difference is hidden behind the ‘electoral’ word 
in its name, as incumbent regime tends to hold elections as a key instrument of regime’s 
legitimization and every time make sure to maintain its own victory. As a result, the 
symbol of freedom and democracy is used against its own values causing the paradox of 
elections. Here comes the main question: could elections still be considered as a facilitator 
of democratic rule? Yonatan L. Morse claim that elections in this case are not simply 
symbolic or facade, they still delegate some responsiveness to an electorate testing the 
regime’s mobilization capacity. (Morse, 2012, p. 165) 
One of the main tricky features of electoral authoritarian regime is that on paper 
it seems to represent the whole “set of representative institutions that define modern 
democracy”, while in the reality it is more of “the institutional manipulation”. (Schedler, 
2013, p. 55) This way, although political actors have a full capacity and freedom on paper, 
they do not enjoy it in reality. Political parties, for instance, are usually state-controlled 
and could not be considered as a real opposition or limitation of power of the ruling 
regime.  
In this light, Kubik’s and Bernhard’s definition of memory agents, which mainly 
includes political actors that are involved in power struggle, could not be fully applied to 
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authoritarian regimes. Although it might seem that actors are participating in the 
mnemonic field, in fact they have no real impact on a situation as it is fully state-
controlled. If actors would be able to make a difference, they would not be allowed to 
enter the political arena from the very beginning. This is especially relevant for the 
Russian case, as one of the most prominent scholars on Russian politics Vladimir 
Gel’man characterises the situation in the country as “anything but opposition”. (Gel'man, 
2005, p. 25) He argues that Kremlin’s policy is quite evident example of using a politics 
of fear to maintain the status quo and handle the opposition movements. (Gel'man, 2015) 
Although memory agents are usually not directly involved in the questions of 
power struggle and are mainly focused on commemoration politics, according to Kubik 
and Bernhard, they deal with political memory. Heiko Pääbo defines it as “the collective 
memory that is functioning according to the needs and demands of power relations”, as 
political memory tends to serve particular political aims and interests of political elites. 
(Pääbo, 2011, p. 24) In this understanding, memory agents follow certain political 
interests, when in authoritarian settings their capabilities are limited. Thus, 
conceptualization of memory actors in non-democratic regimes does not allow us to 
include political parties and politicians, as they tend to be part of state-controlled facade 
institutions. For the purposes of the current study, I find it relevant to consider as memory 
agents only NGOs that aim to commemorate certain historical events. Even in 
authoritarian environment NGOs usually enjoy some degree of independence and room 
for maneuver that worse being studied.  
However, in non-democratic settings some NGOs could have support from the 
government and could be established as an initiation from above. This is especially the 
case in electoral authoritarianisms when state is creating an artificial network of civil 
society institutions that are, in fact, partly or fully state-controlled. It could be NGOs that 
partly exist on government funding and have to implement requests from above in order 
to exist and receive support. Nonetheless, if one compares them to fully financially 
independent NGOs, the second ones could enjoy freedom but have much less resources 
in general. And by resources, I mean not only financial component, but human resources, 
connections, access to media, ability to rent a place for the event or office in general. It 
could especially get problematic if activities of this independent NGOs could be in any 
way considered as undermining the incumbent regime, as in this case authoritarian 
 23  
government would tend to cut all of the available resources of this particular NGO. 
(Spires, 2011, p. 12) In this regard, within the framework of current study, organizations 
who receive government support and were established as the initiative from above are 
considered as state-driven actors. On the other hand, organizations who do not receive 
government’s support and were established as a part of the ‘grassroot’ process and civil 
society initiatives are considered to be bottom-driven non-state actors.  
Mentioned distinction on state and non-state actors is important within 
authoritarian environment, as there is a clear asymmetry between the actors with 
government support and without it. Independent NGOs could be easily oppressed by the 
regime if they express any attempts to criticize the government or start to be politically 
involved. When on the opposite, state actors are mostly fully dependent on the regime 
and controlled by it. Thus, mentioned asymmetry does not allow healthy competition in 
the field, as state actors tend to have an advantage.  
Moreover, as I mentioned in previous subchapter, memory agents with different 
institutional origin might have different aims and behavioral strategies. State controlled 
memory agents could be used to legitimize the regime and silence particular issues, when 
non-state agents might try to do the opposite. Within the next subchapter, I am going to 
focus on how in particular memory agents can make a difference and influence the 
mnemonic field on a given issue.    
1.4 Framing as an instrument of the memory regime’s formation  
As government and state actors are privileged in establishing a remembrance 
policy that would correlate with their interests, it is important to consider what 
instruments could be used for a successful formation of a memory regime. What tools are 
available for actors in a mnemonic field and how do they help to promote particular 
commemorative strategy?  
One of the most powerful instruments that is especially relevant for the 
authoritarian countries with the lack of free and independent media is framing. The 
history of this notion starts from Erving Goffman introducing concepts of frames and the 
process of framing. (Goffman, 1974) He suggested a new way of organizing peoples’ 
experiences and characterized a frame as “a structure of individual’s perception of 
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society”. (Malinova, 2017, p. 58) In general, framing allows people to investigate 
interactions from everyday experience and construct social worlds and meanings. 
(Gordon, 2018, p. 324) Adam Simon and Michael Xenos note that people in the process 
of reflecting on messages tend to organize them in a certain order in their mind and put 
some labels. The frame itself is defined as a template to structure a data to put in order 
various pieces of information. (Simon & Xenos, 2000, p. 366) Zhongdang Pan and Gerald 
M. Kosicki identify two popular dimensions of understanding the notion of frame within 
academia: sociological and psychological conceptions (individual cognitive process). 
Combinations of both of them allow us to have a deeper understanding of how frames 
function: not only as “internal structures of the mind”, but as “devices embedded in 
political discourse”. (Pan & Kosicki, 1993, p. 57) This feature of the frames allows to use 
the concept within different disciplines of science. 
Within political science, framing became one of the major theories in research on 
political communication. (Brugman & Burgers, 2018, p. 1) Frames become a subject of 
study when one considers key messages that are being translated by political actors. 
According to Martin Wettstein, through the process of emphasizing and selecting 
particular aspects in accord particular position on a given issue political actors promote 
their frames in media and through other channels. Actor’s aim is to make their interests 
to be the most appealing ones to the public and shape the way people think about a given 
issue. (Wettstein, 2012, p. 319) Indeed, in studies of communication in politics or media, 
framing is considered as an instrument that is actively used by speakers to address an 
audience with the aim to promote a certain interpretation of one or another issue. 
According to it, speakers make a conscious choice to point out particular aspects, 
interpretations or meanings of a given historical event. Within the factors that could 
potentially define their position on a subject are political agenda or political interests of 
elites. (Malinova, 2017, p. 58)  
But why public buys imposed messages and ready-made frames? The studies have 
shown that framing actually helps individuals to process the received information and 
reduce the complexity of political issues on agenda. If we look at frames’ specifics and 
mechanisms of work, there are various stages of data framing. Firstly, starts the process 
of messages building by political elite and actors (who tend to be entrepreneurs), then 
reception of frames by the public and further effect of frames at different levels of 
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cognitive response. (Wettstein, 2012, p. 319) I would put this thought further and suggest 
adding another step - receiving a feedback from public that goes back to entrepreneurs. 
Without accessing a feedback, political actors cannot understand efficiency of the 
produced frames. Moreover, to my understanding, from the theoretical perspective 
framing process should be viewed not as a linear process with an end, but as a cycle. This 
approach allows to view a framing process as an endless process of formation of messages 
and narratives from entrepreneurs on one side, and their reception, reflection and 
feedback production from the other. Thus, framing would remind a concept of policy 
cycle, or a process of formation of policies within a state by political elite. Initially 
introduced by Harry Lasswell, the concept suggests understanding the development of 
new policies on the governmental level as a process that starts from agenda setting and 
choice of appropriate alternatives by political elite and further implementation of one of 
the options. Policy’s realization is essentially followed by receiving a feedback from 
citizens through media and public discussions, which evolves into new policies that take 
into account the feedback. (Howlett & Ramesh, 2003, p. 13) To my mind, the process of 
framing has a similar logic as in some way it is a dialog between political actors that 
develop narratives and public that either accepts them either not. In case they are not 
accepted, entrepreneurs produce new frames that would be tolerated by public. However, 
the framing production is a rather complex process as frames have different functions. 
Scholars define four functions of frames which include the following: definition 
of the problem (or agenda setting – paying public attention to a given issue), causal 
interpretation (“identification of underlying forces of the problem”), moral evaluation 
(how the problem is being implicated) and treatment recommendation (solutions that are 
proposed to solve the issue). (Zhou & Moy, 2007, p. 80) Thus, in some cases framing of 
a given issue not only suggest a particular way of perception, but also assumes a specific 
solution to solve it.  
According to Entman, the process of framing also essentially involves the notions 
of selection and silencing. According to the author, actors tend to pick up particular parts 
of the narrative and silence them on purpose. (Entman R. M., 1993, p. 52) This is 
especially relevant for a historical narrative as silencing of some parts of collective 
memories tends to be a common process.  
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Within academia the framing approach is most actively used in studies under the 
disciplines of political science and communication. (Brugman & Burgers, 2018, p. 4) The 
framing analysis is also actively used in memory studies. Thus, for example, Lucy Bond 
has studied the frames of memory within which 9/11 was commemorated. (Bond, 2015) 
Author identifies that the tragic event is mainly commemorated through values of 
patriotism and freedom, as those are the key messages that are being translated. (Clark, 
2016, p. 229) Another study examines how extremist movements in Czech Republic 
frame issues related to Moslem migration. Authors seek to explain growing popularity of 
radical right movement in the country by demonstrating how politicians connect 
“dangerous” radical Islam and groups of migrants and refugees. (Strapáčová & Hloušek, 
2018) Another example of Cillian McGrattan’s study shows how different nations after 
the Second World War started to use framing to reposition particular historical events and 
represent them in different light. (McGrattan, 2014) 
Olga Malinova has used framing to analyse Russian memory politics. In her study 
she evaluated official presidents’ speeches on the occasion of Victory Day in Russia – 9 
May, to identify framing of the Great Patriotic War. In total seventeen speeches were 
examined delivered by Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev from 2000 till 2016. Author 
distinguished sixteen different frames and discovered which of them were used more 
frequently throughout the studied period. According to the results, there are four frames 
that have been used on an annual basis and all of them repeat Soviet rhetoric of 
commemoration of the victims. However, Olga Malinova has also identified a recent 
tendency towards ‘nationalization’ of the war memory. It is reflected within a frequent 
use of the frames of victory as a uniting symbol and manifestation of national character. 
(Malinova, 2017, pp. 59-61) Thus, framing allows to discover character of changes that 
took place over time in a given study period.  
For the purposes of the current study, framing could be a beneficial concept that 
can help to identify possible differences in the discourse that actors have. Moreover, it 
allows not only to track differences, but to give a certain qualitative characteristic to their 
nature. This feature could be very useful if there is a need to explain what stood behind 
the establishment of the monopoly of commemoration that was initiated by the state.  
To sum up, within the framework of this research, Russian memory regime is 
going to be studied through the analysis of discourses produced by memory agents. The 
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aim is to map up the differences that two organizations in the field of commemoration of 
Stalinist repressions have. According to the definitions of memory regime and memory 
agent that were outlined within the current chapter, I suggest that the nature of the 
differences will be expressed through the narrative that actors use in the commemorative 
practices. With the help of framing analysis, the narrative will be studied and compared.  
From the theoretical background it could be concluded, that state in authoritarian 
settings is especially sensitive towards the potential sources of instability. Organisations 
that are in any way undermining the incumbent regime are considered as a possible threat. 
I argue that this rule applies to non-state memory agents and they could be oppressed by 
the government in case they are critical towards the regime. While state memory agents, 
on the contrary, would benefit from governmental support that they receive in return to 
loyalty and regime’s legitimization practices. In this light, clear asymmetry between state 
and non-state memory agents could be expected, when actors have not only different 
resources and capabilities, but aims and behaviors.  
In order to identify those differences, the framing analysis will be undertaken to 
test this theoretical argument on the case of commemorative practices in Russian field. 
Discourse of two memory agents with different origins that aim to commemorate Stalinist 
repressions will be analysed in order to define the possible differences. The following 
chapter proceeds with the general characteristic of Russian memory politics on the issue 
of Soviet crimes. The chapter also introduces main actors in the field and their activities.  
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2. Introduction to Russian memory politics 
This is a background chapter that provides an empirical literature review. The analysis of 
the existing literature on Russian case will give a characteristic of current memory regime 
and demonstrate recent developments.  
Stalinist repressions are considered to be part of Soviet crimes. Soviet historians 
and party leaders had put sophisticated amount of effort to create a myth of Soviet ‘Great 
Patriotic War’ and other events that took place over this period of time behind which it 
could be quite hard to distinguish truthful facts. The pre-war and war periods are 
considered to be the richest in terms of crimes that have been committed. Most of the 
archives are still kept under the secret so it is hard to estimate number of victims as there 
is no evidence that even the numbers promulgated by Russian authorities are final. 
(Nuzov, 2014, p. 275) 
Due to lack of proven facts and silenced nature of Soviet history, some of the 
crimes were admitted by a Soviet or Russian side only after quite some time. For instance, 
only in 1989 during the more liberal period of Perestroika that was followed by a Soviet 
Union collapse, USSR admitted the existence of secret protocols of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop non-aggression pact of August 23, 1939. In a context of Baltic Sea states, the 
most important Soviet crimes are considered to be Soviet occupation of Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania and arrests and deportations of citizens of those countries to Siberia. For 
instance, during first mass deportation from Baltic States took place in 1941, when around 
45,000 persons were deported. (Rahi-Tamm, 2007, p. 17) However, Soviet military 
occupation that took place in Baltic states is still not recognized, as official Russian 
position remains to be the voluntary will of the states to join USSR. This and many other 
violations of human rights remains to be silenced in Russian official discourse. Even if 
the Soviet participation was at some point admitted, it is usually trivialized by Russian 
authorities. (Nuzov, 2014, p. 273) For example, the way it happened with Katyn massacre 
in 1940, when over 20,000 Polish prisoners were murdered by Soviet officers: Soviet 
authority recognized their role only 50 years after – in 1990. (Etkind, et al., 2012, p. 101) 
However, nowadays Russian authorities emphasize that it is considered to be ‘an ordinary 
crime’ that was not outstanding in the context of warfare of that time. (Guryanov, 2013, 
p. 695) 
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There is no lack in controversial events in Soviet history that tend to be viewed 
differently from victim’s and perpetrator’s sides. Can Red Terror that took place as a part 
of Russian Civil war in 1917-1922 be considered as one of the Soviet crimes? Or forced 
collectivization of the peasantry in Soviet republics that started from 1928 and 
Holodomor in Ukraine in 1932-1933? Or deportations of entire ethnic groups to Siberia? 
(Andrieu, 2011, p. 199) Scholars in academia seem not have a clear agreement on a 
certain definition. Most of them focus either on specifically war crimes (that are done 
during the WWII and have Red Army involved) (Heisey, 2018) (Nuzov, 2014) 
(Guryanov, 2013) or Stalin’s Great Terror in late 1930s with further GULAG 
imprisoning. (Paperno, 2001) (Khapaeva, 2016) Kora Andrieu argue that if we take a 
popular within scientific community path of comparing two confronting totalitarian 
regimes, it becomes clear that in case of Holocaust it was a “coherent, organized project”. 
While Soviet terror combined various heterogeneous actions: political repressions, ethnic 
crimes, war crimes and etc. Author states that coherent narrative of all the mentioned 
elements is yet to be written. (Andrieu, 2011, p. 207) 
Within current paper the focus is done on Stalin’s repressions and deportations. 
This conscious choice was done, due to the fact that this aspect of Soviet crimes is fully 
admitted by Russian authorities. Rehabilitation process has started in November 1989, 
when Stalin’s deportations of the repressed peoples were declared as “illegal and 
criminal” by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Later, few laws dealing with legacy of 
Stalinism were released, including the law “On the Rehabilitation of the Repressed 
Peoples” of April 1991, that admitted that Stalin’s deportations of entire peoples were 
acts of genocide.11 Another law introduced later, has defined a notion of political 
repressions and established procedures for rehabilitating victims.12 (Koposov, 2018, p. 
222) Moreover, victims of political repressions were immortalized in the monument that 
is located in the centre of Moscow since 2017. “Wall of Sorrow” is the ‘first nationwide 
monument’ dedicated to the issue of Soviet crimes that is established in the capital of 
Russia.13  
                                                        
11 Law of the RSFSR No. 1107-I of April 26, 1991 “O reabilitatsii repressirovannykh narodov”. 
12 Law of the RSFSR No. 1761-I of October 18, 1991 “O reabilitatsii zhertv politicheskikh repressiy”. 
13 Official website of Memory Fund “Opening of the monument “Wall of Sorrow” URL: 
http://memoryfund.ru/открытие-монумента-стена-скорби/.  
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As state authorities have admitted the existence of the crimes and are involved in 
institutionalisation of commemoration by establishing the monument in the downtown of 
Russian capital, we can conclude that the issue of political repressions is not silenced by 
Russian authorities. In fact, it somehow involves different state and non-state actors. That 
is why this topic seems to be a perfect fit for the current research: Stalin’s repressions is 
a field where various actors actually cross and interact. To my mind, this is a rare case, 
taking into account authoritarian origin of Russian state which tends to oppress any 
dissident activities. In current research I plan to analyse this interaction and emphasize 
key messages translated from both sides. In the following subchapter Russian memory 
politics and changes that took place after period of Perestroika are explained.  
2.1 Transformation of memory discourse after collapse of USSR 
Current subchapter is dedicated to the literature review on how the discourse on Soviet 
crimes has changed over the 1990s and give a general characteristic to the current 
Vladimir Putin’s policy on the issue.  
Mentioned above introduction of new laws that on a state level criticizes actions 
done by a previous regime in a given country received a name of transitional justice. In 
more broad sense, it refers to incumbents’ actions and perceptions of past historical events 
concerning the repressions or crimes against state’s population done by previous regime. 
(Pettai & Pettai, 2015, p. 6) The laws released by Soviet and Russian authorities that I 
mentioned above have marked a change in official state narrative about the past. 
Developed and protected by Soviet propaganda myth of ‘Great Patriotic War’ started to 
be reintegrated during short period of democratization that took place throughout 
Perestroika and 1990s under Yeltsin’s presidency. (Khapaeva, 2016, p. 68) According to 
Nikolay Koposov, Yeltsin’s politics of memory were focused on ‘rejecting the 
communist past’, however, his government and Russian liberals did not manage to 
develop and implement a ‘Western-style democratic culture of memory’. As one of the 
pillars of this culture would be Holocaust remembrance. (Koposov, 2018, p. 220) 
According to Soviet propaganda that is still strongly existing in the discourse, Russians, 
not Jews, were main Hitler’s victims. Thus, Holocaust is simply not part of the myth of 
the war. (Koposov, 2018, p. 250) 
 31  
 Scholars tend to agree that the process of transitional justice in Russia over the 
Stalinist repressions is not taking place. (Andrieu, 2011, p. 198) (Nuzov, 2014, p. 275) 
(Koposov, 2018, p. 238) Putin’s memory politics are defined as “selective historical 
amnesia that is focused on rehabilitation of Stalinism”, that is characterized by 
unwillingness to admit the criminal nature of Soviet regime. (Khapaeva, 2016, p. 63) 
Olga Malinova seems to notice the same tendency and admits that governing political 
elite tries to selectively adopt Soviet legacy, while “avoiding its critical reassessment”. 
(Malinova, 2017, p. 44) Mariëlle Wijermars refer to Russian history as a ‘rhetorical 
toolbox’ that is used by Putin to frame and justify his policy decisions. She agrees that 
Russian authorities support certain historical narratives that meant to establish political 
legitimacy in the present. The myth of ‘Great Patriotic War’ and Stalin’s strong leadership 
create a useful historical foundation for the current regime that tries to promote a 
continuous narrative of ‘a strong state’ and ‘centralized leadership’. (Wijermars, 2016, p. 
84) Ilya Nuzov develops this argument further and conclude that Stalin’s rehabilitation 
and continuous violations of human rights prevent Russia from successful 
implementation of transitional justice. (Nuzov, 2014, p. 275) (Andrieu, 2011, p. 214) 
Nikolay Koposov seems to agree, as while doing the analysis of Memory Laws in Putin’s 
Russia he argues that Moscow is not ready to fully admit the communist crimes. While 
complete recognition assumes the same approach as Nazi crimes were assessed by the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, for Russian authorities it would undermine the myth of the war. 
And myth is crucial to be maintained as according to it, Red Army did not occupy East 
Europe, but liberated it from Nazi Germany. (Koposov, 2018, p. 254)  
When previous presidents used to distance themselves from Soviet regime, 
Vladimir Putin has used Soviet past to rebuild the nation’s pride. (Andrieu, 2011, p. 211) 
The period of 1990s was especially hard for Russian population due to the economic 
transition which resulted in dramatic shortages in people’s income. Thus, already since 
1993 public surveys started to illustrate that the majority of Russian population rate Soviet 
political and economic systems higher than the new democratic ones. (Nuzov, 2014, p. 
312) Vladimir Putin noticed this trend and effectively mastered the narratives of 
‘stability’ and ‘pride’ in order to satisfy electorate that was disappointed by the 
democratic transition. He has also learnt the importance of historical narratives during the 
‘self-deprecating’ Gorbachev’s and Yeltsin’s eras and instead started to rehabilitate the 
glory of Stalinist past. (Andrieu, 2011, p. 211) 
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The case of memorial museum Perm-36 proves the trend of silencing of Stalinist 
crimes under the Putin’s presidency. Perm-36 used to be one of Soviet GULAG camps 
and during Perestroika period with the joint support of Russian-wide human rights 
activism it became a museum, which aimed to commemorate the memory of victims of 
Soviet terror. However, in 2015, the museum was taken over by local authorities and 
closed. After its reopening, all mention of Stalin’s crimes was removed, and it became a 
museum dedicated to “the employers and personnel of the Soviet camps”. (Khapaeva, 
2016, p. 68) This is one of the examples of state takeover of local initiatives that 
demonstrates the establishment of the monopoly on commemoration. James V. Wertsch 
while studying the transformation of Russian collective memory concerning the World 
War II, came to the conclusion that the country illustrates strong state control of memory. 
However, author also admits that it is not unique and could be found anywhere in the 
world. (Wertsch J. V., 2008, p. 124)  
In general, Russian citizens are not fully aware of scale of Soviet crimes and their 
consequences for other nations. According to data from surveys that were held in 2017, 
every fourth Russian citizen has not heard anything about Stalin’s repressions. However, 
the awareness of Russians depends on their age: among citizens over 60 years 86% know 
about repressions, but in the youngest group (18-24 years) the number is already 54%.14 
Current data fully reflects Russian memory politics within recent years under Putin’s rule, 
when the issue of Stalinist crimes tends to be silenced.  
To sum up, Russian government tends to use the narrative of Soviet glory in the 
nation building process. Stalinist repressions are either silenced either seem to be used as 
an opportunity to promote the necessity of internal stability and danger of possible 
confrontation. There also tends to be a strong monopoly over the commemoration that 
suppresses independent initiatives coming from below with their own understanding of 
historical truth. According to the definition of memory regime developed in the 
theoretical part of current paper, the full characteristic of Russian case could be given 
after the analyses of memory agents, commemorative events and used narratives. Within 
the next subchapter I continue the analysis by focusing on main actors in Russian 
mnemonic field concerning Stalin’s repressions and Soviet crimes.  
                                                        
14 Official website of international information group Interfax “Every fourth Russian has not heard anything 
about Stalin's repressions” URL: https://www.interfax.ru/russia/581465.  
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2.2 Existing mnemonic actors 
This subchapter has a clear focus on characteristic of existing state and non-state 
actors in the Russian mnemonic field. The provided description will include 
organizations’ main activities, structure and funding.  
2.2.1 Memorial 
 
Memorial is respected and well-known public association that was founded in 
1987 as a public group initiative to “perpetuate the memory of repressed victims”. The 
initiative received support in other Soviet republics and later became a fully international 
historical, educational, charitable and human rights society.15  
Organization started its first initiative during Perestroika, when its activists 
collected 30,000 signatures as a campaign for a support of a monument to the victims of 
Stalin’s repressions. During the 1990s the research center was established in Moscow 
aimed to collect and archive existing information about the victims, later a small museum 
with a public library opened their doors as well. Already by 1998 there were more than 
50,000 files on victims in the Memorial’s archives. The files included not only names of 
GULAG prisoners, but letters, camp memories, rehabilitation documents and etc. 
(Andrieu, 2011, p. 215) In 1990 the first monument was established, it was an uncut stone 
from one of the first GULAG camps in Russia – Solovetsky labor camp. (Applebaum, 
2003) 
Nowadays they have clear aims that include the following:  
- assistance in developing a civil society and democratic state governed by the rule 
of law, that excludes the possibility of a totalitarianism rehabilitation; 
- promotion of democratic values based on rule of law, overcoming totalitarian 
stereotypes and asserting individual rights in political practice and public life; 
- participation in restoration of historical truth and remembrance politically 
repressed victims in totalitarian regimes.16 
                                                        
15 Official website of Memorial Society “What is International Memorial” URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-
ru/memorial/memorial-international-aims/.   
16 Ibid.   
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In order to achieve mentioned goals, Memorial is involved in the activities 
including:  
- identifying and publishing information about crimes and mass violations of 
human rights committed by totalitarian regimes in the past; 
- participating in the rehabilitation of historical truth concerning the crimes of 
totalitarian regimes, studying its causes and consequences; promoting access to 
sources of information (archives, libraries, Museum funds and etc.); 
- promoting full moral and legal rehabilitation of politically repressed persons, 
helps to seek for support and social benefits to compensate caused damage; 
- promoting the remembrance of victims of totalitarianism, the creation of 
memorial complexes, as well as academic, informational and educational centers, 
public archives, museums and libraries; 
- providing assistance to the former repressed and their families, provides legal 
protection of the interests of the repressed and their families; 
- identifying, publishing and analyzing information about human rights violations 
today; 
- participating in the development and implementation of projects and programs 
aimed to create solid bases against rehabilitation of totalitarianism; 
- carrying out peacekeeping activities in the resolution of ethnic and religious 
conflicts; 
- contributing to the establishment of a free, open, legal, democratic society in those 
States where the offices of the International Memorial have been established.17 
Mentioned activities are implemented not only in post-Soviet space, however this 
is the initial geographic base for the Memorial movement. Now there are more than 50 
organizations in Russia, 6 in Ukraine, one in Belgium, Germany, France, Italy and the 
Czech Republic.18 Memorial is an NGO that does not receive governmental support, but 
private contributions as well as officially registered income as a legal entity. According 
                                                        
17 Ibid. 
18 Official website of Memorial Society “Structure and Organisations” URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-
ru/memorial/departments/#map.   
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to articles of association, Memorial can earn money from its activities, for instance, 
revenue from sales of goods or services.19 
Activities of the organization are well-known within academia as well. Most of 
the studies mention Memorial’s input in Russian memory politics and rehabilitation of 
victims of Stalinist repressions. (Sniegon, 2019, p. 107) (Guryanov, 2013, p. 696) 
(Andrieu, 2011) (Paperno, 2001, p. 89) (Koposov, 2018) (Etkind, et al., 2012, p. 107) 
According to Kora Andrieu, Memorial’s outstanding activity is a confirmation that 
nonstate actors can in fact initiate and advance the process of transitional justice. The 
absence of required truth initiatives on a state level does not mean that the past will not 
be addressed. In case when there is a lack of confirmation from a state and it refuses not 
only to make public apologies, but to build monuments or provide the access to archives, 
it is up to civil society to deal with this issue. When bottom-driven initiatives happen, 
civil society has a chance to become “a substitute for the state, compensating for its 
inaction”. (Andrieu, 2011, p. 215) 
At the beginning of its activity, Memorial “enjoyed some support from the higher 
echelons of the Soviet hierarchy”. For instance, mentioned above laws on rehabilitation 
of repressed victims that were signed in 1991, were drafted with the active involvement 
of Memorial. (Koposov, 2018, pp. 222-223) However, not every regime is ready to 
tolerate local initiatives, especially if they somehow undermine legitimacy of an 
incumbent. Growing Russian authoritarianism could not afford Memorial and many other 
independent NGOs investigating actual democratization and liberalization levels in a 
state. Thus, in 2006 Russian authorities released a law against Russian NGOs with a 
financial support from abroad. According to a new law every NGO in a country was asked 
to re-register with a submission of detailed financial report. (Wijermars, 2016, p. 88) In 
case there was even a small part of foreign financial support, the organization receive a 
status of ‘foreign agent’ and its activities in Russia become illegible. Historians note, that 
the notion of ‘foreign agent’ was firstly used by Stalin in 1930s to characterize spies or 
other ‘enemies of the people’. (Khapaeva, 2016, p. 68) This is a second charismatic 
adoption of narratives from a Soviet past that allow us to make certain parallels with old 
                                                        
19 Articles of Association, official website of Memorial Society, P. 11. URL: 
https://www.memo.ru/media/filer_public/b7/55/b755c2b8-e394-42ce-87aa-ddf242f49247/ustav_mm-
opt_1.pdf.   
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totalitarian regime and a new one. Memorial did not become an exception and also 
received a status of “non-profit organization performing the function of a foreign agent” 
by the Ministry of justice of the Russian Federation.20 
In fact, already starting from 2007 Memorials’ activists began to face problems. 
In November 2007, member of Memorial Oleg Orlov and other journalists were attacked 
in Ingushetia. In December 2008, Memorial’s St. Petersburg office experienced a 
paramilitary raid. (Khapaeva, 2016, p. 68) As Nikolay Koposov notes, the raid coincided 
with the opening of the International Conference on Stalinism that was organized by 
Memorial. (Koposov, 2018, p. 260) Police has confiscated their entire archive that was 
worth more than 20 years of work. It included memoirs, interviews, photographs and 
other documents that provided details of the GULAG’s history and names of the victims. 
(Andrieu, 2011, pp. 216-217) Later, in 2009, Memorial’s Grozny office started to face 
issues: one of their member Natalia Estemirova was murdered and her colleagues were 
forced to emigrate. In 2018, new head of Grozny’s office Oyub Titiev was arrested. In 
the same year Memorial’s Ingush office in Nazran was set on fire.21 Nowadays, Memorial 
is trying to challenge the decision on its ‘foreign agent’ status in a court. Organization 
argues that they act exclusively according to Russian interests, as they help to protect 
human right. Memorial considers the “forced entry” into the register of ‘foreign agents’ 
as an attempt to prevent their activity.22  
It is indeed true that Memorial is active in collecting facts about present violations 
of human rights in Russia, for example in Chechnya or Dagestan. Activists believe that 
the fact that violations continue to take place in modern Russia is directly connected to 
“unaddressed past legacies”. (Andrieu, 2011, p. 215) The approach of Memorial to 
highlight not only violations of human rights in the past, but current ones as well, might 
be considered as a threat to a glory of Putin’s regime. In this light, all the difficulties with 
which Memorial has to face nowadays make sense, as Russian authorities are not 
interested in promotion of their nondemocratic activities. In this light, Memorial is 
                                                        
20 Official website of Memorial: “Proceedings on the status of a foreign agent are ongoing” URL: 
https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/departments/intermemorial/news/22.  
21 Official website of Memorial “Memorial’s history” URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/history/. 
22 Old Memorial’s website “About Memorial’s enty in the register of foreign agents” URL: 
http://old.memo.ru/d/204002.html.   
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considered as an organization conducting anti-governmental activities. (Kolesnikov, 
2017, p. 4)  
To sum up, in current research Memorial is analysed as a non-state actor in the 
authoritarian mnemonic filed. Its recourses are limited due to oppression coming from 
above as a result of establishment of monopoly on commemoration over Stalinist 
repressions in Russia. In the next part of the current paper I move from independent non-
state mnemonic actor to the one newly introduced to the field. It deals with the same issue 
of remembrance of victims of political repression under the Soviet rule, however it is 
considered as a state actor. 
2.2.2 Memory Fund 
 
In 2015 Dmitry Medvedev signed the State Policy Concept for Perpetuating the 
Memory of Victims of Political Repression, enacted by the Government of the Russian 
Federation. The Fund “Perpetuating the Memory of Victims of Political Repression”, 
abbreviated as the Memory Fund, was registered in 2016 as part of the Concept’s 
implementation. Remembrance of the victims of political repression is considered as the 
main mission of the Fund. It does so through support of educational programs, research 
and events that aim to perpetuate the memory of victims of repression. The sources of 
financial support consist of private and corporate donations in the form of cash and other 
property. 23  
Key activities of the Fund include the following:  
- “support of the GULAG History State Museum; 
- support victims of political repression; 
- museumification of objects related to the history of repression; 
- creation, development and support of memory museums and memorial centers; 
- production of educational content, including documentaries and feature films, 
performances and exhibitions; 
- support research and educational projects and events; 
                                                        
23 Official website of GULAG History Museum “Memory Fund” URL: 
https://gmig.ru/en/support/memory-fund/.  
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- development and implementation of multimedia projects, collection of historical 
data; 
- publishing activities”.24 
The State Museum of GULAG history that is mentioned as part of Memory 
Fund’s activities was founded in 2001. It was an initiative of Anton Antonov-Ovseenko, 
who once was a prisoner in one of the Stalin’s labor camps himself. The initial museum 
building was located in the center of Moscow, not far from Bolshoi Theater and Russian 
Parliament. However, in 2015 the museum was closed and moved to a new geographical 
location, outside the Moscow city center. The moving process took place with the help of 
the City of Moscow authorities. (Sniegon, 2019, pp. 124-128)  Nowadays, the museum is 
officially supported by Moscow Department of Culture and new head of the organization 
Roman Romanov is in the Council of Memory Fund.25 
Concerning other participants of the Council of the Fund, there could be found 
people in one or another way connected to Russian authorities. For example, Mikhail 
Fedotov is Advisor to the President of the Russian Federation or Vladimir Lukin, who is 
a Member of Federation Council, or Sergey Karaganov (Honorary Chairman of the 
Presidium of the Council on Russian Foreign and Defense Policy).26 To my 
understanding, this could prove the top-driven nature of the Memory Fund and their 
activities, as sufficient part of the Fund’s Council is in a way connected to Putin’s 
government. Moreover, the whole organization was established in order to implement the 
Policy Concept.  
However, according to Olga Malinova, the establishment of a new Medvedev’s 
Conceptof State Policy on Commemorating the Memory of Victims of Political Repress
ion indicates about certain progress. In her research, Malinova has analysed main stages 
in evolution of the official memory policy in Russia over the last 25 years. She considers 
the new policy as a ‘window of opportunity’ for local actors of memory politics who want 
                                                        
24 Ibid.  
25 Official website of GULAG History Museum “History and Mission” URL: 
https://gmig.ru/en/museum/history-and-mission/.  
26 Official website of GULAG History Museum “Memory Fund” URL: 
https://gmig.ru/en/support/memory-fund/.  
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to contribute into the process of victim’s commemoration. However, she admits the 
ambiguity of the situation, as Russian authorities’ actions demonstrate the aim to keep 
control over the field of memory politics. “It invests resources into the consolidation and 
promotion of the state-centered historical narrative focused on the theme of national 
glory.” (Malinova, 2019, p. 100)  
The first project of the Fund was the erection of “first nationwide monument” to 
the victims of political repression “The Wall of Sorrow”. The founders use the phrase 
according to which the monument is “first”, while they seem to not admit the 1990’s stone 
from Solovetski island that was erected by Memorial. The Wall was opened in the 
downtown of Moscow on 30 October 2017. It was done in accordance with the special 
decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On the construction of a memorial to 
victims of political repression” signed by Putin two years earlier. The monument was 
created with the help of state funds and public donations based on the project of sculptor 
G.V. Frangulyan. It is a 30 meters wall with several arches, composed of the outlines of 
numerous figures, symbolizing the victims of repression.27 
Another project implemented within the framework of Medvedev’s policy 
Concept was realized with the support of Memory Fund and was aimed at creating 
association of Russian museums of memory. In 2015, the State Museum of GULAG 
history initiated the establishment of the Association that would become a network of 
Russian museums. The purpose of association was not only to launch the process of 
remembrance of historical injustice, but to promote public dialogue on the issues of terror 
and political repressions.28 Nowadays, there are 32 museums all over Russia that joined 
the Association.29 They serve as a platform for different open lectures and public talks. 
Museums’ staff and researchers also participates in seminars in Moscow that are 
organized by the Association on the yearly bases. For example, last one took place in 
November 2017, when more than 30 researchers from 21 Russian cities arrived in 
                                                        
27 Ibid. 
28 Official website of Memory Fund “Projects” URL: http://memoryfund.ru/проекты/.  
29 Official website of Association of Russian Museums of Memory “About Association” URL: 
http://memorymuseums.ru/#about.  
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Moscow to share their experience in research.30 The process of creation of the centralized 
network of museums could be indeed useful for best practices exchange, however it is a 
familiar scheme used in Putin’s Russia. Centralization helps to establish a better control 
over the regions to make sure there is no diversity of opinions.  
Memory Fund is also involved in a project that received a government support of 
the Presidential Grants Fund, which provides funding for Russian civil society 
development. The project is called «My Gulag» and is implemented by Visual 
anthropology studio of the State Museum of GULAG history. It was created to record 
video memories of people, who faced mass repressions themselves or were influenced by 
them.31 
It is important to emphasise that the main perception of activities of the 
organization is done based only on the publications on its webpage. Since it was 
established only recently, there is lack of existing research on its impact on Russian 
mnemonic field in academia. Due to that fact, critical assessment of the Fund’s activities 
is limited. If in the case of Memorial, almost every relevant piece of research on Russian 
memory politics refers to the activities of this organization, with Memory Fund the 
situation is different. The organization itself and nature of its establishment has not been 
studied yet. Nevertheless, multiple connections to the state’s authorities and the fact that 
organization was established after Dmitri Medvedev’s initiative, allow us to characterize 
Memory Fund as a state actor in the current mnemonic field. The growing presence of 
state in the field demonstrates the establishment of monopoly on commemoration. State 
memory agents enjoy financial support and do not lack resources that could be used to 
promote particular view on historical events. Thus, it could be concluded that Russian 
memory regime has clear asymmetry in power struggle where state actor Memory Fund 
has an advantage over the non-state agent Memorial. In order to conclude the analyses of 
Russian memory regime, we have to proceed with analyses of existing commemorative 
activities and narratives that are produced by both actors. This will be done within the 
following chapter of the current study.  
  
                                                        
30 Official website of Association of Russian Museums of Memory “The third annual seminar "From 
Solovki to Kolyma” URL: http://memorymuseums.ru/seminar/2017.   
31 Official website of My Gulag project “About the project” URL: https://mygulag.ru/about.  
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3. Methodology 
 
The main aim of current chapter comes down to outlining used methodology, selection 
of material and description of the analysis. It firstly explains the choice of material 
including used criteria, then proceeds with description of the steps of analysis.  
For the purposes of the current study, framing analysis was picked up as a method 
of choice. In theoretical chapter the concept of frames was already introduced, as well as 
some of the existing research in academia. Framing analysis is actively used in studies 
within the field of political communication and memory politics. Within advantages of 
the method its narrow focus could be outlined. Work with specific historical events 
always assumes qualitative examination that allows to demonstrate a deep understanding 
of an issue. Framing analysis helps to track even smallest changes in discursive practices 
that could be crucial for identifying reasons for a transformation. Due to the specifics of 
my research question that aims to explain changes in Russian memory regime, current 
method seems to be the best fit. Based on successful use of framing analysis within studies 
on memory politics in academia, this method will allow me to provide the most precise 
answer to the research question within the framework of current work. Understanding of 
the changes in the frames that are promoted from the government on one side, and frames 
from non-state actor on the other side, will allow me to track down the reasons for regime 
transformation.  
3.1. Materials used for the analysis  
Current subchapter focuses on description of materials used for this study and the 
logic of choice behind it. In order to proceed with characteristic of Russian memory 
regime, there is a need to analyse commemorative activities and institutionalized practises 
of two actors in the mnemonic field on an issue of Stalinist repressions. Activities of 
Memorial and Memory Fund assume public lectures, public statements, speeches of their 
activists and supporters and opening of monuments that are usually connected to certain 
commemorative events. Those events were indicated by both actors as important for the 
process of remembrance of repressed victims. Thus, within the framework of this research 
I focused on identification of commemorative events that touch upon the Stalinist 
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repressions. After creation of a map of particular events relevant for the analysis, I 
proceeded with working with the existing materials on a topic.  
Events were selected by the various criteria. Firstly, they had to be present in the 
agenda of both Memorial and Memory Fund organisations so that comparison of both 
discourses would be possible. Some of the events were relevant only for one and not for 
another organization, for example, Day of memory of Alexander Solzhenitsyn on 3 
August. It is date of death of well-known writer and soviet dissident who shared with his 
honest experience of living in one of the GULAG camps in the famous book “The Gulag 
Archipelago”. Activists of Memory Fund participated in special memory service in the 
necropolis of the Don’s monastery in 2017, when Memorial did not have any activity on 
this date.32 Or some public actions are not attached to any particular events, for instance 
public initiative supported by Memorial “Last address”. This action was established to 
commemorate victims of repressions and put a small sign on a wall of house where a 
person was arrested. After 6 years since the launch of the project, more than 800 signs 
with names have been installed in more than 40 cities and villages of Russia, Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia.33 This project does not have analogies that would be initiated by 
Memory Fund, due to that it is not included in the analysis.  
Another important selection criterion is closely related to the previous one. It is a 
time framework. As Memory Fund is a newly established mnemonic actor in the field, it 
was not present before 2016. Thus, within current research I compare activities of actors 
that took place only after year of 2016. Although this timeframe dramatically limits 
amount of available content, it reflects the recent changes of Russian memory regime and 
demonstrates the recent trend that is important to be studied.  
Third, as this work interacts with events and actions that happened in the past, the 
information about them have to be available on the organizations’ webpages. Both of 
them have archives of their publications and statements: it is https://www.memo.ru/ru-
ru/events/calendar#list for Memorial and http://memoryfund.ru/все-новости/ for 
                                                        
32 Official website of Memory Fund “Day of memory of Alexander Solzhenitsyn” URL: 
http://memoryfund.ru/день-памяти-александра-солженицына/.  
33 Official website of Memorial “Exhibition "Last address/5 years” URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-
ru/events/calendar/453#list.  
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Memory Fund. Those pages became my primarily source of data as they represent main 
activities of the organizations. I have also taken into account interviews with 
organizations’ activists and news about organizations’ activities that were published on 
other media. Links to those materials are also published on the organizations’ websites: 
https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/press/ (for Memorial) and 
http://memoryfund.ru/новости/ (for Memory Fund). Thus, the materials used for the 
analysis have to be publicly available.  
Based on the listed selection criteria, mentioned websites were analysed to find 
list of events which assumed public actions organized by both mnemonic actors within 
last two years (2016-2018) with publicly available information on them. Information 
usually presumed public speeches or statements done by organizations’ activists, 
representatives or supporters. In total, two events satisfied all mentioned criteria: series 
of days of remembrance in Sandarmokh, Krasny Bor and Solovki (August 4-5) and 
National day of remembrance for victims of political repression (October 29-30).  
First unit of analysis - Days of remembrance in Sandarmokh and Krasny Bor. 
They were established and since then annually organized by the St. Petersburg branch of 
Memorial. August 5 is the date of entry into force of the order of the NKVD № 00447, 
which launched a machine of mass repression in August 1937. The memorial action in 
Sandarmokh annually brings together thousands of people: relatives and friends, 
delegations of public organizations from Ukraine, Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Tatarstan, 
Chechnya, Ingushetia and etc. The tradition has existed for more than 20 years. August 
4th is a memory day for another mass burial of the executed in Krasny Bor.34 Days of 
remembrance in Solovki are jointly organized by Solovki museum-reserve, Memorial and 
local administration since 1989. In the same year the country's first permanent exhibition 
about GULAG was opened in the Solovki museum-reserve.35 Series of those days of 
remembrance have different geographical locations and different number of victims, 
however they have one common aspect. They are considered to be the launch of “Big 
                                                        
34 Official website of Memorial “Days of remembrance in Sandarmokh” URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-
ru/events/calendar/373#list.   
35 Official website of Memorial “Days of remembrance in Solovki” URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-
ru/events/calendar/375#list.  
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terror” that started being implemented in August 1937 and was followed by mass murders 
and repressions.  
Second unit of analysis - National Day of Remembrance of Victims of Political 
Repression. The date was chosen in a memory of the hunger strike, which prisoners of 
Mordovian and Perm camps initiated on 30 October 1974. Political prisoners declared 
that this is an action against political repressions in the USSR. Officially this day was 
established by the resolution of the Supreme Council of RSFSR of 18 October 1991 
“About establishment of Day of Remembrance of Victims of Political Repression”.36 In 
2017 Memory Fund opened a monument “The Wall of Sorrow” and launched the action 
“Bell of Memory”. Public action suggests to everyone who is interested to lay flowers, 
light candles and honor the memory of the victims of repression by hitting the bell.37 On 
the day before, at the eve of Russia’s Day of Remembrance of Victims of Political 
Repression, Memorial holds another public action “Return of the Names”, where activists 
of the organization gather at Lubyanka Square around the Solovetsky Stone to read aloud 
the names of Soviet citizens who were shot in Moscow as part of Stalin’s Great Terror.38 
In 2018 Memorial faced issues when Moscow authorities at some point refused to allow 
to hold annual action “Return of the Names” at Lubyanka Square next to Solovetsky 
Stone, but suggested activists to go and implement the action next to the new monument 
of commemoration “Wall of Sorrow”.39 The action, however, eventually took place at the 
traditional spot. As a researcher I am interested in why Moscow authorities started to 
oppress the action, although it had the same goal as the “Bell of Memory” organized by 
Memory Fund on the 30 October. In the next chapter with the help of framing analysis 
this case, as well as another one selected for the analysis, will be examined.  
                                                        
36 Official website of The presidential Council of the Russian Federation on development of civil society 
and human rights “October 30, Russia celebrates the day of memory of victims of political repression” 
URL: http://president-sovet.ru/presscenter/news/read/4221/.   
37 Official website of Memory Fund “Action "Bell of Memory" on the Day of memory of victims of political 
repression” URL: http://memoryfund.ru/акция-колокол-памяти-в-день-памяти-ж/.  
38 Official website of Return of the Names “About return of the names” URL: http://october29.ru/return-
of-the-names/.  
39 Official website of Memorial “Moscow authorities withdrew the approval of the "Return of names” URL: 
https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/departments/intermemorial/news/200.  
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I suggest, that Memorial and Memory Fund as two organizations with different 
origin might have different narrative concerning the same commemorative events that 
take place in the country. The framing analysis that is done within the next chapter of 
current research allow me to identify small differences in the narrative used by both sides. 
In the following subchapter I focus on practical steps that were done in order to implement 
the analysis. 
3.2 Steps of the framing analysis 
 
Current subchapter explains how the framing analysis was undertaken within current 
study. It reflects how the frames were defined and what are the elements they consist of. 
This is the last subchapter that concludes the methodology section and is followed by 
empirical analysis done within the following fourth chapter.  
Firstly, it is important to define understanding of a frame that would be relevant 
for the current study. In the theoretical part I have already outlined the history of the 
concept’s development and existing approaches to understanding of the framing. 
However, for this research I find the definition of Entman to be the best fit as he classifies 
frame as narrative which results in the process of silencing and selecting particular parts 
of the situation to provide specific interpretation. Author indicates that the objects of 
frames are not only events, but issues and actors, including particular individuals or 
groups of people and organizations. (Entman R. , 2008, p. 90) Thus, this approach suits 
for the purposes of current research, as in the characteristic of Russian memory politics 
above there were references to many scholars who argued that Russian authorities 
actively use silencing of particular aspects of Stalinist repressions. By focusing on 
specific events and doing a comparative analysis of two actors, it is possible to compare 
which narratives receive more attention and which are silenced by one of the actors.  
 According to Jim A. Kuypers, in some cases comparative framing analysis is 
especially fruitful as helps to detect differences in the frames that are promoted by 
different actors. The frames are usually composed of some key words, metaphors or 
concepts. Within the framing theory they are considered to be “cues of how language 
choices push our thinking in particular directions”. (Kuypers, 2009, pp. 185-186) Thus, 
in order to proceed with the analysis, I plan to focus on those cues and look how objects 
of frames are characterized by different actors.  
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Table 1. Frames identified in current research. 
Objects      Memorial    Memory Fund 
Remembrance days in Sandarmakh,   Frame I       Frame II 
Krasny Bor & Solovki 
National Day of Remembrance of  Frame III      Frame IV 
Victims of Political Repression 
 
Within the framework of current research, there are two objects of frames, which 
are commemorative events that were selected for the analysis. Remembrance days in 
Sandarmakh, Krasny Bor, Solovki and National Day of Remembrance of Victims of 
Political Repression are central objects as narratives produced by two actors are shaped 
around those events. Therefore, in the following chapter, two frames coming from two 
different actors dedicated to each of the event are analysed, which means four frames 
overall (as it is shown in Table 1). 
Each frame dedicating to a certain object consists of different elements. Those 
elements shape the general narrative that is being produced. Within academia, the most 
frequently used framework of elements is the one brought in by Entman’s definition of 
frames. He outlined four elements that in a way define functions of the frame itself: 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and treatment 
recommendation. (David, Atun, Fille, & Monterola, 2011, p. 332) For the current study 
mentioned elements were adopted for our case. It was necessary due to the fact that most 
of the research with the framing analysis tend to focus on assessment of different media 
channels. News articles traditionally have different content, which is based on a news and 
tend to identify a certain problem that needs attention and solution. Due to the fact that 
case of current research is different and there is a focus mainly on analysis of NGOs 
activities, there was a need to develop new elements and adopt the ones used in academia. 
List of used elements is demonstrated in the Table 2 of the current paper. The 
main aim of pre-defined elements is to guide further analysis so that it will be clear in 
which direction to look for the variables. Theme/topic refers to the name of the online 
publication, it is an adopted version of ‘problem definition’. As most of the used sources 
do not emphasize any particular issue, but rather inform about organization’s activity, I 
found ‘problem definition’ irrelevant for the study. ‘Causal interpretation’ covers 
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“attribution of failure or success regarding a specific outcome”, or in other words it 
consists of key message of the publication which reflects on a given situation. (Matthes 
& Kohring, 2008, p. 264) Elements ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ were also added instead of 
‘moral evaluation’, as for the purposes of current analysis identification of ‘victim’ and 
‘perpetrator’ is more relevant. Due to the ongoing debate in Russian memory politics, 
those roles are not clearly assigned to particular actors or groups or people. Thus, 
Memorial and Memory Fund might actually have different understanding of the situation. 
‘Treatment recommendation’ could include “a call for or against a certain action”, or to 
put it in another way, suggests particular steps or actions to solve the issue. (Matthes & 
Kohring, 2008, p. 264) The last element ‘connection with present’ tend to explain how 
this issue is relevant today.  
 
Table 2. Frames elements and variables explained. 
Frame elements       Variables 
Theme/topic                     Name of the article/publication 
Causal interpretation                Key message 
Victim       Who is viewed as a victim 
Perpetrator             Who is responsible 
Treatment recommendation              What needs to be undertaken 
Connection with present            Why this issue is relevant today 
 
In order to not get lost in the analysis and frames’ elements, guiding element was 
developed, or the main questions that needs to be answered within this part of the 
research: (1) how do Memorial and Memory Fund frame the selected commemorative 
events? (2) are there any differences in the way how same events are framed by both 
organizations? (3) if there are, in which elements of the frames do they occur? Those 
questions are important to keep in mind while giving a general overview of the frames.  
Thus, within the next chapter of the study I will elaborate a bit more on the chosen 
commemorative events to provide some context and explain the results of the analysis. 
Selected material from Memorial’s and Memory Fund’s websites would be manually 
analysed in order to define how each of the commemorative events is framed by actors. 
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The frame will be characterized based on defined elements, which consist of different 
variables that will be outlined as a result of the analysis. Identified variables will be 
messages from the texts that fall under one of the frame’s elements. On the bases of 
categorized variables, the general characteristic of each element will be given and 
elaborated. This step-by-step process will allow to conclude on whether there are 
differences in the frames’ elements and what is their value in the key message of each 
frame overall.  
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4. Analysis of Russian mnemonic field  
 
4.1 Map of important commemorative acts   
 
Current subchapter provides a clear map of events with different locations over Russia. 
The characteristic of each event is provided as well as description of activities (public 
actions) of Memorial and Memory fund that took place over those dates. 
 
 In previous chapter I explained the logic behind the selection of commemorative 
events for the analysis. Selected events take place in different geographical locations that 
are shown on the map (Figure 1). Although National day of remembrance for victims of 
political repression is relevant within the context of the whole country, public actions 
organized by Memorial and Memory Fund took place in Moscow, Moscow and 
Leningrad regions, Krasnodar, Yekaterinburg and Magadan that are highlightened on the 
Figure 1.40 In the following subchapters the commemorative actions dedicated to each of 
the event are discussed in a more detail and followed by a framing analysis with 
elaboration on frames’ elements. 
 
Figure 1. Map of Commemorative events. 
 
 
                                                        
40 Official website of Memory Fund “Action "Bell of Memory" on the Day of memory of victims of political 
repression” URL: http://memoryfund.ru/акция-колокол-памяти-в-день-памяти-ж/.  
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4.1.1 Days of remembrance in Sandarmokh, Krasny Bor and Solovki 
(August 4-5) 
Initially days of remembrance were established and annually organized by 
Memorial on Solovki Icelands since 1989. At the beginning this initiative was supported 
by Solovki museum and local organization. In the first years, days of remembrance were 
attended by former Solovki prisoners, including Pavel Evensen, Leo Marthin, Sergey 
Schegolkov, Alexander Tabor, Irina Levitskaia, Victor Vasiliev, Vladimir Bowl, Igor 
Vikentiev, Nicholay Racin. At that time the country's first permanent exhibition about 
GULAG “Solovki Special Purpose Camp” was opened in the Museum (authors – A. V. 
Bazhenov, A. V. Miller, J. A. Brodsky, A. A. Soshina). Then on the site of the former 
camp cemetery, which is now a memory lane on the street Paul Florensky, a monument 
‘Solovki stone’ was established. After the opening of the monument, the first Orthodox 
service took place in the Monastery after a 60-year break that happened under a Soviet 
rule. Until 2014 Days of remembrance were supported by the Museum and local 
administration, however from 2015 it is only Memorial who is organizing them. They are 
attended by activists of Memorial from St. Petersburg and Moscow branches, relatives of 
Solovki prisoners, historians, civil society activists, journalists and bloggers. In 2018 for 
the first time Memory Fund helped to organise days of remembrance in Solovki.41 
Every year next to the Solovki stone during the days of remembrance there are 
mourning ceremonies that include church services and laying of flowers. Days of 
remembrance used to be held in June, before the mass burials in Sandarmokh and Krasny 
Bor were discovered in 1997. Nowadays the joint commemoration process is established 
that unites Sandarmokh, Krasny Bor and Solovki. Days of remembrance start on August 
4th with the funeral ceremony that takes place at the memorial cemetery in Krasny Bor 
and on the next day – in Sandarmokh. August 5 is considered to be the date of entry into 
force of the order of the NKVD № 00447, which launched a machine of mass repression 
in August 1937. The memorial action in Sandarmokh annually brings together thousands 
of people: relatives and friends of the victims, delegations of public organizations from 
                                                        
41 Memorial official website “Days of remembrance in Solovki” URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-
ru/events/calendar/375#list.  
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Ukraine, Poland, Finland, Lithuania, Tatarstan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and etc. The 
tradition has existed for more than 20 years.42  
 Analysis of the Frame I that was produced by Memorial on a topic could be seen 
in Appendix 1 of the current study. In total three articles were selected for the framing 
analysis.43 One of them is not located on Memorial’s website, however it was linked to 
the article dedicated to Days of remembrance in Solovki. Two of the articles give a 
background on a history behind the commemoration activities and explain how Memorial 
is involved in them. The third article is a reportage done by one of the journalists that 
participated on the Days of remembrance in Solovki with the Memorial’s activists.  
 All of the selected articles briefly reflect on historical events that took place in the 
areas and what commemorative activities are organized today in the element of causal 
interpretation. As victims are viewed not only people who were imprisoned or/and killed, 
but their relatives who seek justice for what has happened. Moreover, local activists and 
supporters of Memorial do also face issues. For example, article on Days of remembrance 
in Krasny Bor emphasize that in 2018 commemoration activities would have special 
meaning due to resumed prosecution of Karelian historian Yuri Dmitriev. Memorial 
supports the activist and emphasize that it is an unjustified persecution from authorities. 
Yuri Dmitriev dedicated his life to collect the information about people who were killed 
in the polygons of death and released books with the list of the victims’ names. This 
narrative of continuing unjustified persecutions of activists who are trying to find out the 
hidden truth could be clearly seen in all the text samples. In the third article, author refers 
to police officers who arrived to Solovki to talk to Memorial’s activists to make sure the 
commemoration activities were authorized and that they could not be considered as 
protest actions. Thus, victims of the situation are not only repressed people during Soviet 
era, but activists that are involved in the investigations and commemoration. In this light, 
                                                        
42 Memorial official website “Days of remembrance in Krasny Bor” URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-
ru/events/calendar/373#list.  
43 (1) Markelov S., 7x7 website “Stone Elephant: How to Erase the Memory of the Camp Past in Solovki” 
URL: https://semnasem.ru/daysofmemory/; (2) Memorial official website “Days of remembrance in 
Solovki” URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/events/calendar/375#list; (3) Memorial official website “Days 
of remembrance in Krasny Bor” URL: https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/events/calendar/373#list. 
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the perpetrator is not only Soviet authorities that launched mass repressions back at that 
time, but Russian authorities that prevent and suppress investigation processes.  
 As a treatment recommendation Memorial encourage continue investing in 
awareness raising campaigns and support local activists who try to seek justice. Another 
important element of the frame which is ‘connection with present’ emphasize the fact that 
current regime not only does not support Memorial’s activities, but in fact tries to 
suppress them. Local authorities in Solovki encourage silencing process of truthful facts 
about the Solovki Camp and try to prevent commemorative activities.  
 To sum up the overview of the analysis of the first frame, Memorial applies the 
label of victims over its own activists and relatives of repressed/killed people. Their 
narrative emphasizes the unjustified persecutions and attempt to silence the historical 
events that comes from Russian authorities.  
 In the second frame on the same historical events that is produced by Memory 
Fund slightly different picture could be seen. (Appendix 2) Two articles were selected for 
the analysis and both of them are located on the Memory Fund’s website.44 Articles 
mainly reflect on what the organization is currently active on and how the Concept of 
State Policy of Perpetuating the Memory of Victims of Political Repression is start being 
implemented. In the ‘victim’ element of the frame mostly people that were directly 
affected by the repressions are mentioned. Possible perpetrator is not present in the 
narrative in the same way as connection with present is not mentioned. One of the articles 
refer to historical facts and emphasize how big the number of killed people in Karelia 
was, however it could be seen that the articles have a nature of report on Memory Fund’s 
activities and do not encourage to do anything.  
 The comparison of two frames concerning the Days of commemoration in 
Sandarmokh, Krasny Bor and Solovki could be seen in Appendix 3 of the current study. 
The main differences in the elements of frames concern ‘victim’, ‘perpetrator’ and 
‘connection with present’. Memorial tends to consider itself as part of the victim of the 
situation, as their commemorative activities are trying to be prevented and activists are 
                                                        
44 (1) Memory Fund official website “Meeting of the Interdepartmental working group in Karelia” URL: 
http://memoryfund.ru/заседание-межведомственной-рабочей-2/; (2) Memory Fund official website 
“Days of Remembrance in Sandarmokh” URL: http://memoryfund.ru/дни-памяти-на-сандармохе/.  
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oppressed. While Memory Fund defines victims as people who were repressed under the 
Soviet rule. The ‘perpetrator’ element is also different in the two frames, as Memorial 
makes Soviet and Russian authorities responsible for the crimes and continuing 
persecutions, when Memory Fund does not emphasize who is in charge of historical 
events. In this regard, Memorial encourage to participate in commemorative activities 
and support their activists who faced some issues dealing with Russian authorities. 
Memory Fund, on the contrary, does not make clear connection with nowadays explaining 
why the issue of mass repressions and murders in Sandarmokh, Krasny Bor and Solovki 
is relevant today. Within the following part of the current study frames dedicated to 
National day of remembrance for victims of political repression are going to be analysed. 
4.1.2 National day of remembrance for victims of political repression 
(October 29-30)  
National Day of Remembrance of Victims of Political Repression was established 
in 1991 by the resolution of the Supreme Council of RSFSR.45. The date was chosen in a 
memory of the hunger strike, which prisoners of Mordovian and Perm camps initiated on 
30 October 1974. Political prisoners declared that this is an action against political 
repressions in the USSR. Since 2007, at the eve of Russia’s Day of Remembrance of 
Victims of Political Repression – the day before (29 October) Memorial annually holds 
public action “Return of the Names”. On that day activists of the organization gather at 
Lubyanka Square around the Solovetsky Stone to read aloud the names of Soviet citizens 
who were shot in Moscow as part of Stalin’s Great Terror.46 Public action lasts for the 
whole day – 12 hours, when everyone who wants can come over, light a candle and read 
the names of the victims out loud.   
In 2017 Memory Fund opened a “first nationwide monument” to the victims of 
political repression “The Wall of Sorrow”. The founders use the phrase according to 
which the monument is “first”, while they seem to not admit the monument erected by 
                                                        
45 Official website of The presidential Council of the Russian Federation on development of civil society 
and human rights “October 30, Russia celebrates the day of memory of victims of political repression” 
URL: http://president-sovet.ru/presscenter/news/read/4221/.   
46 Official website of Return of the Names “About return of the names” URL: http://october29.ru/return-
of-the-names/.  
 54  
Memorial on Lubyanka Square. The new monument was done in accordance with the 
special decree of the President of the Russian Federation “On the construction of a 
memorial to victims of political repression” signed by Vladimir Putin. It was created with 
the help of state funds and public donations based on the project of sculptor G.V. 
Frangulyan.47 A year later, on 30 October 2018, a new public action was organized by 
Memory Fund and Moscow authorities next to “Wall of Sorrow”. It is called “Bell of 
Memory” and suggests to everyone who is interested to lay flowers, light candles and 
honour the memory of the victims of repression by hitting the bell.48 Next to the 
monument a symbolic bell in the form of a rail was installed. Everyone could take part 
and ring in the memory of those who were killed in the years of Stalin's terror. The public 
action takes place not only in Moscow, but in other regions of Russia as well: Moscow, 
Leningrad, Sverdlovsk, Magadan and Krasnodar regions.                          
In 2018, Memorial faced issues when Moscow authorities at some point refused 
to allow to hold annual action “Return of the Names” at Lubyanka Square next to 
Solovetsky Stone, but suggested activists to go and implement the action next to the new 
monument of commemoration “Wall of Sorrow”.49 The action, however, eventually took 
place at the traditional spot. One of the articles I used for the analysis of the third frame 
explains the situation in detail. (Appendix 4) In total, there were four articles used for the 
frame: three of which were published on the websites of the liberal media and one on 
Memorial’s webpage.50 While doing the analysis, I have done an interesting observation: 
                                                        
47 Ibid. 
48 Official website of Memory Fund “Action "Bell of Memory" on the Day of memory of victims of political 
repression” URL: http://memoryfund.ru/акция-колокол-памяти-в-день-памяти-ж/.  
49 Official website of Memorial “Moscow authorities withdrew the approval of the "Return of names” URL: 
https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/departments/intermemorial/news/200.  
50 (1) DW official website “Wall of sorrow" in Moscow - a reminder of the repressed victims” URL: 
https://www.dw.com/ru/стена-скорби-в-москве-напоминание-о-жертвах-репрессий/a-41139891; (2) 
“Radio Freedom” official website “Soviet dissidents are against the installation of the memorial "Wall of 
sorrow" URL: https://www.svoboda.org/a/28823404.html; (3) BBC Russia official website “Monument to 
Stalin's victims: why "Memorial" is in doubt?” URL: 
https://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2015/03/150319_stalin_victims_monument_debates; (4)  Official 
website of Memorial “Moscow authorities withdrew the approval of the "Return of names” URL: 
https://www.memo.ru/ru-ru/memorial/departments/intermemorial/news/200. 
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there are no articles mentioning opening of the new monument in Moscow on Memorial’s 
website. That is the main reason behind the fact that most of the articles for the analysis 
of the third frame were taken from external websites. It seems that Memorial made a 
conscious choice to ignore the establishment of a new competing monument and does not 
want to attract any additional attention to it on their website. In one of the articles 
Memorial’s historian Sergei Bondarenko explains that: “The Solovetsky stone and the 
action "Return of the names" is a spontaneous, national initiative from below. A 
monument on Sakharov Avenue is a great event, which we have been waiting for a long 
time, but at the same time it is an official initiative approved from above”.51 Thus, 
Memorial has its own reasons not to support the new initiative that is coming from 
Kremlin, although technically new big monument in Moscow is what the organization 
was promoting for in a long time.  
In general, elements of the first frame correlate with the ones in the third frame – 
both of them are produced by Memorial. Although two of those frames are dedicated to 
different events, they follow the same logic. Memorial argues that Russian authorities are 
involved in ongoing violations of human rights and repressions that are taking place 
today. One of the articles explains the current situation the following way: “the 
government uses one hand to put people into jail and another one – to put the monument 
[to the victims of repressions]”.52 According to another article, this dual situation does 
not give Vladimir Putin “a moral right to install the monument” as he is an embodiment 
of injustice in modern Russia.53 Third article cite the open letter of Soviet dissidents who 
encourage not to support the installation of the monument: “You cannot divide victims 
of political repressions into those who deserve a monument, and those who yet can stay 
                                                        
51 “Соловецкий камень и акция "Возвращение имен" – это стихийная, народная инициативу снизу. 
А памятник на проспекте Сахарова – это большое событие, которого мы долго ждали, но в то же 
время это официальное начинание, утвержденное сверху” citation from DW official website “Wall of 
sorrow" in Moscow - a reminder of the repressed victims” URL: https://www.dw.com/ru/стена-скорби-в-
москве-напоминание-о-жертвах-репрессий/a-41139891. 
52 “[…] одной рукой государство сажает, а другой ставит памятник” citation from ibid. 
53 “[…] Владимир Путин не имеет морального права устанавливать такой монумент […]” citation 
from BBC Russia official website “Monument to Stalin's victims: why "Memorial" is in doubt?” URL: 
https://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2015/03/150319_stalin_victims_monument_debates; 
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unnoticed”.54 This narrative puts Russian government in the ‘perpetrator’ section of the 
frame and politically repressed people in modern (and not Soviet) Russia in the ‘victim’ 
one. All of the analysed articles make sure to emphasize that there is no clear line between 
Soviet repressions that took place in the past and the ones that are ongoing in modern 
Russian state: “you can see ‘past’ in the ‘present’ almost in every step”.55 This connection 
with the present that is done by Memorial is very important for the comparative analysis, 
as it tends to be not present at all in the last fourth frame of the current study. 
The fourth frame is dedicated to narrative produced by Memory Fund (Appendix 
5). All together seven articles were analysed: six from the official organization’s webpage 
and one is from Official website of the administration of the President of Russia. 56 Most 
of them simply refer to the activities that have been implemented from the Memory 
Fund’s side to commemorate the victims. Many of the articles mention people from 
Russian government that participated in one or another event. For instance, one of the 
articles refer to the full list of participants: “a member of the Federation Council, 
Chairman of the Board of Fund of Memory of Vladimir Lukin, the Deputy Mayor of 
Moscow in Government of Moscow on issues of social development Leonid Pechatnikov, 
                                                        
54 “Нельзя разделять жертв политических репрессий на тех, кому уже можно ставить памятники, и 
тех, кого можно пока не замечать […]” citation from “Radio Freedom” official website “Soviet dissidents 
are against the installation of the memorial "Wall of sorrow" URL: 
https://www.svoboda.org/a/28823404.html.  
55 “Прошлое в настоящем видится чуть ли не на каждом шагу” citation from DW official website “Wall 
of sorrow" in Moscow - a reminder of the repressed victims” URL: https://www.dw.com/ru/стена-скорби-
в-москве-напоминание-о-жертвах-репрессий/a-41139891. 
56 (1) Memory Fund official website “Press-conference in TASS” URL: http://memoryfund.ru/1259-2/; (2) 
Memory Fund official website “The action "Bell of memory" on the National day of remembrance for 
victims of political repression took place in Moscow” URL: http://memoryfund.ru/акция-колокол-
памяти-в-честь-дня-пам/; (3) Memory Fund official website “The collection of stones from memorable 
places is finished” URL: http://memoryfund.ru/завершился-сбор-камней-из-памятных-ме/; (4) Memory 
Fund official website “The installation of the monument "Wall of sorrow" has started in Moscow” URL: 
http://memoryfund.ru/в-москве-началась-установка-монумент/; (5) Memory Fund official website “The 
exhibition "Wall of sorrow" was opened in Magadan” URL: http://memoryfund.ru/выставка-стена-
скорби-открылась-в-ма/; (6) Official website of the administration of the President of Russia: ‘Opening 
of the memorial to victims of political repression “Wall of Sorrow” URL: 
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55948; (7) Memory Fund official website “Muscovite has donated 
coins from 50's and 90's” URL: http://memoryfund.ru/москвичка-пожертвовала-монеты-50-х-и-90-х-г/. 
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the adviser of the President of the Russian Federation, Chairman of the Council under RF 
President on development of civil society, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Fund of 
Memory of Mikhail Fedotov, the Chairman Emeritus of the Presidium of the Council on 
foreign and defense policy, member of the Board of Fund of Memory of Sergey 
Karaganov”.57 In this way, Memory Fund emphasizes that government authorities are 
also involved and interested in the issue of commemoration.  
Another interesting aspect of the fourth frame is focus on the fact that installation 
of the monument is widely supported by Russian citizens in different regions of the 
country. For instance, one of the articles is dedicated to the story of elderly woman who 
decided to donate her personal savings of coins from Soviet time to the new monument. 
“The head of Memory Fund Roman Romanov invited Varvara Ivanovna to the 
construction of the monument, so that she could personally participate in the process of 
melting of the coins”.58 In other articles Memory Fund refer to the nation-wide 
fundraising process: “We have received funding from the government, but we believe 
that it is fundamentally important that everyone contributes to the creation of the 
memorial. By giving a very small contribution, we join the memory of the innocent 
victims”.59 This focus seems to be done in order to highlight that although the initiative 
comes from the state, it is supported from below and Russian citizens recognize its 
importance. It, however, contradicts to what Memorial is saying – according to another 
agent, their initiatives are truly driven from below and are the result of joint actions of 
civil society, historians and activists all over Russian regions. Competition for the 
‘bottom-up nation-wide’ status between the two memory agents is in fact not surprising, 
as existing request from citizens to commemorate the victims is the best legitimization of 
agents’ actions. When organization does some particular actions not because state 
encourage them to do that, but due to popular requests from population. This message 
                                                        
57 Memory Fund official website “Press-conference in TASS” URL: http://memoryfund.ru/1259-2/. 
58 Memory Fund official website “Muscovite has donated coins from 50's and 90's” URL: 
http://memoryfund.ru/москвичка-пожертвовала-монеты-50-х-и-90-х-г/. 
59 “Государство выделило средства, но мы считаем, что принципиально важно, чтобы каждый 
человек внес свою лепту в создание мемориала. Отдавая совсем небольшой взнос, мы приобщаемся 
к памяти невинных жертв” citation from  Memory Fund official website “The exhibition "Wall of sorrow" 
was opened in Magadan” URL: http://memoryfund.ru/выставка-стена-скорби-открылась-в-ма/. 
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could be seen in the ‘causal interpretation’ element of the fourth frame pretty often (in 
five out of seven articles).  
Another important aspect that characterize the fourth frame is that in most of the 
cases only Soviet people that were repressed are viewed as ‘victims’ and the ‘perpetrator’ 
element is not mentioned. This narrative is similar to the second frame that was also 
produced by Memory Fund on the previous commemorative event. The memory agent 
seems not to emphasize who is responsible for all the crimes and violations that took 
place. Thus, the important connection that Memorial makes in this regard that violations 
of human rights are still continued in Russia, is simply absent in the narrative of another 
memory agent. Due to that the last element of the fourth frame ‘connection with present’ 
refer to abstract importance of commemorative activities for modern Russia. In the speech 
of Vladimir Putin dedicated to the opening of new memorial that was also analysed within 
the fourth frame, the president mention that remembering the tragedy of repression will 
help to build a new society on values of trust and stability. He emphasizes how important 
this memory of repressions is for young generations that are responsible for the future of 
the country. The president also mentioned that “this terrifying past cannot be deleted from 
national memory or […] justified”.60 I find it interesting that he outlines the importance 
of acceptance of the past events and highlight that justification is impossible, when 
nowadays there is a clear tendency of rehabilitation of Stalin. Indeed, Vladimir Putin does 
not mention Stalin’s name in the whole speech and does not outline who is responsible 
for “this terrifying past”.61 In this way, the president condemns Soviet repressions yet not 
blaming anyone particular for them.  
This approach is completely opposite to the one suggested by Memorial. In 
Appendix 6 the comparative table of third and fourth frames could be seen. The main 
difference concerns the ‘victim’ and ‘perpetrator’ elements of the frame. Memorial tends 
to shift focus from people repressed under the Soviet rule to politically repressed people 
in modern Russia, which makes Russian authorities the main perpetrator. While general 
narrative of the fourth frame does not imply the same logic: Soviet people remain to be 
the ones who actually suffered, and the perpetrator tends to be not covered. In this light, 
                                                        
60 Official website of the administration of the President of Russia: ‘Opening of the memorial to victims of 
political repression “Wall of Sorrow” URL: http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/55948. 
61 Ibid. 
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in the third frame produced by Memorial the connection with present is done in a way 
that violations of human rights are being continued. While Memory Fund in the fourth 
frame concludes that commemoration is important for the future of Russia as it brings 
stability and trust.   
Those contradicting narratives that are provided by two actors in the mnemonic 
field seem to define the reasons behind asymmetry in their relations. In the following 
subchapter the focus is done on the discussion of the nature of Memorial and Memory 
Fund and meaning behind differences in their narratives. 
4.2 Establishment of a monopoly of commemoration 
 
Current subchapter is concluding the empirical part of the paper. It aims to connect the 
analysis that was done in previous subchapter with the theoretical expectation that was 
outlined in the theoretical part of the current study.  
In one of the articles used for the analysis if the third frame Memorial’s historian 
Sergei Bondarenko while referring to the current situation in Russian mnemonic field 
mention the monopoly on memory. He emphasizes that this is very important and relevant 
discussion for today’s Russia as there are attempts to establish “who should remember 
the repressions and what is the right way to do that”.62 
Indeed, Russian government by using state-controlled agent tries to establish 
monopoly over the commemoration of Soviet crimes and Stalinist repressions in Russia. 
Establishment of the new monument in Moscow dedicated to the victims of Soviet 
repressions, when there was one already initiated by another memory agent, illustrates 
state’s take over of the commemoration. It does not only touch upon the monuments 
themselves, but more importantly commemorative activities which always come along 
the memorials. Within the framework of this research two commemorative events were 
analysed and in case of National Day of Remembrance of Victims of Political Repression 
there is clear competition on commemoration that two actors have demonstrated. Both 
Memorial and Memory Fund have commemorative activities – “Return of the Names” 
                                                        
62 “[…] кто и как должен помнить о репрессиях […]” citation from DW official website “Wall of 
sorrow" in Moscow - a reminder of the repressed victims” URL: https://www.dw.com/ru/стена-скорби-в-
москве-напоминание-о-жертвах-репрессий/a-41139891. 
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and “The Bell of Memory” that aim to involve citizens and broader audience in the 
process of remembering. Two mentioned institutionalized activities have not only 
different geographical locations, but slightly different narratives that were distinguished 
within the subchapter above. 
Non-state memory agent Memorial tries to emphasize the connection of 
repressions happened in the past under the Soviet rule to the ones that take place 
nowadays in Russia. In this light, not only Soviet authorities are responsible for the crimes 
of the past, but Russian government that continues acting in the same line. This narrative 
is not supported by authoritarian regime for simple reason – it undermines the legitimacy 
of the current government. Before, the narrative translated by Memorial was somehow 
tolerated by the regime, but within recent years it became stricter and less free and 
demonstrated the need to oppress the critics. Establishment of the monopoly over 
commemoration became one of the solutions to the issue that was implemented with the 
help of involvement of state-controlled memory agent.  
Memory Fund does not have any ‘uncomfortable’ truth in their narrative. This 
memory agent seems to have the exact same purposes as independent Memorial – to 
commemorate victims of repressions. However, the narrative of both organizations 
differs. Memory Fund emphasizes – repressions are part of the far past and not present. 
Through this key message state actor legitimizes the regime, demonstrating government’s 
involvement in censure of the past and direct participation in commemorative activities 
that aim to prevent the same violations happening today. However, the censure is done in 
the indirect way, when actual transitional justice is not taking place: there are no political 
actions to bring the past crimes to justice and no trials of persons who have committed 
these crimes. Moreover, the name of the most responsible person in repressions Stalin is 
not even mentioned. If we go back to Jay Winter’s typology introduced in the theoretical 
chapter of the current study, it becomes clear that this is a perfect example of secular 
memory regime, when no one in particular is blamed for the certain historical events. In 
Russian state memory discourse, the responsible person or regime or institution for the 
Soviet repressions is being silenced. This, in fact, is not surprising in light of recent 
rehabilitation of Soviet glory and positive image of Stalin that takes place under Vladimir 
Putin’s rule. The president has mastered those narratives to use them in nation-building 
process after Soviet Union’s collapse and now they are part of instruments that are used 
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to legitimize the incumbent regime. State-controlled Memory Fund seems to become one 
of those instruments that can promote the ‘right’ narrative in the indirect way.  
Analysis of memory agents active in Russian memory field has proved the 
existence of asymmetry, when state actor is more powerful and non-state memory agent 
experiences lack of resources. Mentioned asymmetry in their relations is explained by 
differences in the translated narratives by the both sides. Thus, Russian memory regime 
could be characterized as the monopolized one, where clear asymmetry of state and non-
state actors could be seen. The institutionalized commemorative practices regarding 
Stalinist repressions tend to silence particular aspects of collective memory, for instance, 
the responsible actor for the violations of the past. The process of silencing is done 
through the narrative that is translated by state-controlled memory agent. I argue, that 
behind the process of silencing there is a need to legitimize authoritarian government that 
uses façade institutions in order to do so.  
To sum up, within the current chapter, the empirical part of the study was 
implemented. Framing analysis as the method of choice allowed to identify differences 
in narratives that are present in the Russian memory discourse over the issue of Stalinist 
repressions. Distinguished differences contributed to the analysis of Russian memory 
regime and helped me to conclude on reasons behind the establishment of the monopoly 
on commemoration. As a result, it turned out that two memory agents were established 
with different aims: one was initiated from below to seek justice and find pieces of 
historical truth, when the other was introduced from above to legitimize the current 
regime and establish a monopoly over commemoration. Authoritarian environment has 
helped to build an asymmetry in relations of two memory agents in the field.  
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Summary 
Current part of the study aims to sum up what has been done within the framework of the 
current work. This section reflects on correlation between outlined goals of the study and 
its outcomes. It highlights briefly all the achieved results and provides a general 
evaluation of the current study.  
The aim of this study was to give a characteristic of current memory regime in 
Russia concerning the Stalinist repressions by mapping out the differences between 
memory agents in the field. The research problem addressed by the study came from 
empirical case: one independent memory agent was replaced by a government controlled 
one. The research aimed to define Russian memory regime and explain the reasons behind 
the takeover happened.  
In the developed theoretical framework, memory regime was defined as a set of 
institutionalised practises that are initiated by memory actors to commemorate particular 
history through a certain narrative (where there are particular victims and responsible for 
the crimes perpetrators). Thus, in order to provide a full characteristic of the regime there 
were had to be outlined (1) memory agents, (2) commemorative events and (3) narratives 
used by actors with a special focus on who is viewed as a victim and a perpetrator. This 
defined the further structure of the current work as all mentioned aspects were supposed 
to be covered.  
In order to conceptualize the notion of memory agent that would be suitable for 
Russian case, theoretical background on non-democratic political regimes was 
introduced. This helped to bring the importance of state and non-state actors, as non-state 
ones have limited resources in authoritarian settings. Mentioned distinction is crucial, as 
there is a clear asymmetry between the actors with government support and without it. 
Moreover, memory agents with different institutional origin might have different aims 
and behavioral strategies. State controlled memory agents could be used to legitimize the 
regime and silence particular issues, when non-state agents might try to do the opposite.  
From the theoretical background it was concluded, that non-state memory agents 
could be oppressed by the government in case they are critical towards the regime. While 
state memory agents, on the contrary, would benefit from governmental support that they 
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receive in return to loyalty and regime’s legitimization practices. In this light, clear 
asymmetry between state and non-state memory agents was expected, when actors have 
not only different resources and capabilities, but aims and behaviors. In order to identify 
those differences, the framing analysis was undertaken to test this theoretical argument 
on the case of commemorative practices in Russian field. Discourse of two memory 
agents with different origins that aim to commemorate Stalinist repressions was analysed 
in order to define the possible differences.  
The next part of the study proceeded with the general characteristic of Russian 
memory politics on the issue of Soviet crimes. Legal background was introduced all 
together with theoretical developments on the topic that exist in academia. Main actors in 
the field were characterised and introduced: Memorial and Memory Fund. It was 
concluded that Russian memory regime has clear asymmetry in power struggle where 
state actor Memory Fund has an advantage over the non-state agent Memorial.  
The following part of the current study had introduced the elements of the frames 
that were used for the further empirical analysis. The main questions that were answered 
within the analyses were the following: (1) how do Memorial and Memory Fund frame 
the selected commemorative events? (2) are there any differences in the way how same 
events are framed by both organizations? (3) if there are, in which elements of the frames 
do they occur?  
Two important events in Russian memory politics concerning Stalinist repressions 
were used for the analysis: Days of remembrance in Sandarmokh, Krasny Bor and 
Solovki (August 4-5) and National day of remembrance for victims of political repression 
(October 29-30). Both events met the selecting criteria that were introduced in the 
methodology chapter. Memorial and Memory Fund have different commemorative 
activities on that days, which were analysed within last two years (2016-2018), since 
Memory Fund was introduced into the field. 
Materials for the analysis were selected with another set of criteria and were had 
to be located on the open sources: websites of the mentioned NGOs where they share 
their key events and activities, as well as other news portals that did publications 
concerning selected commemorative events. In total, seventeen articles were selected, and 
four frames identified for the analysis.  
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Analysis has demonstrated that non-state memory agent Memorial tries to 
emphasize the connection of repressions happened in the past under the Soviet rule to the 
ones that take place nowadays in Russia. In this light, not only Soviet authorities are 
responsible for the crimes of the past, but Russian government that continues acting in 
the same line. State actor Memory Fund, on the contrary emphasizes that repressions are 
part of the far past and not present. Through this key message state actor legitimizes the 
regime, demonstrating government’s involvement in censure of the past and direct 
participation in commemorative activities that aim to prevent the same violations 
happening today. However, the censure is done in the indirect way, when actual 
transitional justice is not taking place and the name of the most responsible person in 
repressions Stalin is not even mentioned.  
Analysis of memory agents active in Russian memory field has proved the 
existence of asymmetry, when state actor is more powerful and non-state memory agent 
experiences lack of resources. Mentioned asymmetry in their relations is explained by 
differences in the translated narratives by the both sides. Thus, Russian memory regime 
could be characterized as the monopolized one, where clear asymmetry of state and non-
state actors could be seen. The institutionalized commemorative practices regarding 
Stalinist repressions tend to silence particular aspects of collective memory, for instance, 
the responsible actor for the violations of the past. The process of silencing is done 
through the narrative that is translated by state-controlled memory agent.  
Thus, the study has reached its goal to give a characteristic of the Russian memory 
regime and explain changes in commemorative practises that happened with introduction 
of the new agent. Current research is a unique example of analysis of Russian mnemonic 
field including the newly emerged state actor Memory Fund. Discourses of Memorial and 
Memory Fund were also firstly compared to each other. As there is a clear lack of those 
kind of studies in academia this filed seems to be potentially promising to me, so in order 
to develop my work further, other methods could be applied, for instance, including 
interviews with the organizations’ activists.  
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Appendices  
 
Materials selected and used for the analysis:  
 
a) Days of remembrance in Sandarmokh, Krasny Bor and Solovki (August 4-5) 
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Elements of the Frame I. 
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ci
et
y 
ac
tiv
ist
s 
Pe
rp
et
ra
to
r  
So
vi
et
 a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s, 
lo
ca
l a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s &
 
re
pr
es
en
ta
tiv
es
 o
f S
ol
ov
ki
 m
on
as
te
ry
 
So
lo
vk
i l
oc
al
 
ad
m
in
ist
ra
tio
n 
&
 
m
us
eu
m
's 
au
th
or
iti
es
  
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
n 
co
nt
in
ue
 a
rg
ue
 fo
r j
us
tic
e 
&
 tr
ut
hf
ul
 
m
em
or
ie
s a
bo
ut
 v
ic
tim
s  
 - 
 
Co
nn
ec
tio
n 
w
ith
 
no
w
ad
ay
s 
lo
ca
l a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s e
nc
ou
ra
ge
 si
le
nc
in
g 
pr
oc
es
s &
 tr
y 
to
 p
re
ve
nt
 
co
m
m
em
or
at
iv
e 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 
pa
rti
cu
la
r p
ar
ts 
of
 th
e 
hi
sto
ry
 a
re
 b
ei
ng
 si
le
nc
ed
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Appendix 2. 
Elements of the Frame II. 
  
Fr
am
e I
I 
  
  
El
em
en
ts 
of
 th
e 
fra
m
e 
Te
xt
 5
 
Te
xt
 6
 
Th
em
e/
to
pi
c 
M
ee
tin
g 
of
 th
e 
In
te
rd
ep
ar
tm
en
ta
l 
w
or
ki
ng
 g
ro
up
 in
 K
ar
el
ia
 
D
ay
s o
f R
em
em
br
an
ce
 in
 S
an
da
rm
ok
h 
Ca
us
al
 in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
Co
nc
ep
t o
f S
ta
te
 P
ol
ic
y 
of
 
Pe
rp
et
ua
tin
g 
th
e 
M
em
or
y 
of
 V
ic
tim
s 
of
 P
ol
iti
ca
l R
ep
re
ss
io
n 
is 
sta
rt 
be
in
g 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
M
em
or
y 
Fu
nd
 ta
ke
s p
ar
t i
n 
th
e 
an
nu
al
 
D
ay
s o
f r
em
em
br
an
ce
 o
f t
he
 v
ic
tim
s o
f 
So
vi
et
 te
rro
r 
V
ic
tim
 
po
lit
ic
al
ly
 re
pr
es
se
d 
pe
op
le
 in
 
K
ra
sn
y 
Bo
r 
re
sid
en
ts 
of
 K
ar
el
ia
 &
 p
ris
on
er
s o
f t
he
 
W
hi
te
 S
ea
-B
al
tic
 c
am
p 
&
 S
ol
ov
ki
 
ca
m
p 
Pe
rp
et
ra
to
r  
 - 
 
 - 
 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
n 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
Co
nc
ep
t 
to
 b
e 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 c
om
m
em
or
at
io
n 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 
Co
nn
ec
tio
n 
w
ith
 p
re
se
nt
 
 - 
 
 - 
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Appendix 3. 
Comparison of the Frames I & II. 
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Appendix 4. 
Elements of the Frame III. 
  
Fr
am
e I
II
 (P
ar
t 1
) 
  
  
El
em
en
ts 
of
 th
e 
fra
m
e 
Te
xt
 7
 
Te
xt
 8
 
Th
em
e/
to
pi
c 
"W
al
l o
f s
or
ro
w
" i
n 
M
os
co
w
 - 
a 
re
m
in
de
r o
f t
he
 re
pr
es
se
d 
vi
ct
im
s 
So
vi
et
 d
iss
id
en
ts 
ar
e 
ag
ai
ns
t t
he
 
in
sta
lla
tio
n 
of
 th
e m
em
or
ia
l "
W
al
l o
f 
so
rro
w
" 
Ca
us
al
 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
In
 m
od
er
n 
Ru
ss
ia
 p
eo
pl
e 
ar
e 
co
nt
in
ue
d 
be
in
g 
re
pr
es
se
d 
by
 S
ta
lin
's 
m
et
ho
ds
, t
hu
s 
th
e 
ne
w
 m
on
um
en
t i
s h
yp
oc
ris
y 
So
vi
et
 d
iss
id
en
ts 
do
 n
ot
 su
pp
or
t 
K
re
m
lin
's 
co
m
m
em
or
at
iv
e 
ac
tio
ns
 &
 
es
ta
bl
ish
m
en
t o
f t
he
 m
on
um
en
t 
V
ic
tim
 
po
lit
ic
al
ly
 re
pr
es
se
d 
pe
op
le
 in
 m
od
er
n 
Ru
ss
ia
 
po
lit
ic
al
ly
 re
pr
es
se
d 
pe
op
le
 in
 P
ut
in
's 
re
gi
m
e 
Pe
rp
et
ra
to
r  
Ru
ss
ia
n 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
Pu
tin
's 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
n 
St
al
in
ist
 re
pr
es
sio
ns
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
stu
di
ed
, 
na
m
es
 o
f v
ic
tim
s s
ho
ul
d 
be
 p
ub
lis
he
d 
do
 n
ot
 su
pp
or
t g
ov
er
nm
en
t's
 
co
m
m
em
or
at
iv
e 
ac
tio
ns
  
Co
nn
ec
tio
n 
w
ith
 
pr
es
en
t 
So
vi
et
 re
pr
es
sio
ns
 in
 th
e 
pa
st 
ar
e 
pa
rt 
of
 
th
e 
pr
es
en
t  
hu
m
an
 ri
gh
ts 
&
 fr
ee
do
m
s a
re
 c
on
tin
ue
d 
be
in
g 
vi
ol
at
ed
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Appendix 4 (continued). 
 
  
Fr
am
e I
II
 (P
ar
t 2
) 
 
 
El
em
en
ts 
of
 th
e 
fra
m
e 
Te
xt
 9
 
Te
xt
 1
0 
Th
em
e/
to
pi
c 
M
on
um
en
t t
o 
St
al
in
's 
vi
ct
im
s: 
w
hy
 
"M
em
or
ia
l"
 is
 in
 d
ou
bt
? 
M
os
co
w
 a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s h
ad
 w
ith
dr
aw
n 
th
e 
ap
pr
ov
al
 o
f t
he
 "R
et
ur
n 
of
 th
e 
na
m
es
" 
Ca
us
al
 in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
A
ct
iv
ist
s a
re
 n
ot
 su
re
 w
he
th
er
 th
e 
m
on
um
en
t t
o 
re
pr
es
se
d 
vi
ct
im
s e
sta
bl
ish
ed
 
by
 P
ut
in
's 
re
gi
m
e 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
su
pp
or
te
d,
 a
s 
re
pr
es
sio
ns
 in
 a
 w
ay
 a
re
 b
ei
ng
 c
on
tin
ue
d 
M
os
co
w
 a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s t
ry
 to
 st
op
 th
e 
an
nu
al
 
tra
di
tio
n 
of
 c
om
m
em
or
at
iv
e 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 
or
ga
ni
ze
d 
by
 M
em
or
ia
l 
V
ic
tim
 
Ru
ss
ia
n 
lib
er
al
s w
ho
 b
el
ie
ve
d 
in
 g
oo
d 
m
ot
iv
es
 b
eh
in
d 
th
e 
K
re
m
lin
's 
ac
tio
ns
 
M
em
or
ia
l &
 p
ar
tic
ip
an
ts 
of
 th
e 
ac
tio
n 
 
Pe
rp
et
ra
to
r  
Ru
ss
ia
n 
au
th
or
iti
es
 
M
os
co
w
 a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
n 
do
 n
ot
 su
pp
or
t t
he
 in
iti
at
iv
e  
 - 
 
Co
nn
ec
tio
n 
w
ith
 
pr
es
en
t 
Pu
tin
's 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t d
oe
s n
ot
 h
av
e a
 m
or
al
 
rig
ht
 to
 e
sta
bl
ish
 th
e 
m
on
um
en
t a
s 
vi
ol
at
io
ns
 o
f h
um
an
 ri
gh
ts 
ar
e 
sti
ll 
on
go
in
g 
Co
m
m
em
or
at
iv
e 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 o
n 
re
pr
es
se
d 
vi
ct
im
s a
re
 b
ei
ng
 p
re
ve
nt
ed
 b
y 
cu
rre
nt
 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
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Appendix 5. 
Elements of the Frame IV. 
 
  
Fr
am
e I
V
 (P
ar
t 1
) 
  
  
El
em
en
ts 
of
 th
e 
fra
m
e 
Te
xt
 1
1 
Te
xt
 1
2 
Th
em
e/
to
pi
c 
Pr
es
s-
co
nf
er
en
ce
 in
 T
A
SS
 
Th
e 
ac
tio
n 
"B
el
l o
f m
em
or
y"
 o
n 
th
e 
N
at
io
na
l d
ay
 o
f r
em
em
br
an
ce
 fo
r v
ic
tim
s 
of
 p
ol
iti
ca
l r
ep
re
ss
io
n 
to
ok
 p
la
ce
 in
 
M
os
co
w
 
Ca
us
al
 in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
Ru
ss
ia
n 
ci
tiz
en
s s
up
po
rt 
M
em
or
y 
Fu
nd
's 
in
iti
at
iv
e 
&
 re
co
gn
iя
e 
th
e 
im
po
rta
nc
e 
of
 c
om
m
em
or
at
io
n 
M
em
or
y 
Fu
nd
's 
co
m
m
em
or
at
iv
e 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 a
re
 su
pp
or
te
d 
by
 d
iff
er
en
t 
pe
op
le
 a
ll 
ov
er
 R
us
sia
 
V
ic
tim
 
So
vi
et
 p
ol
iti
ca
lly
 re
pr
es
se
d 
pe
op
le
  
So
vi
et
 c
iti
ze
ns
 w
ho
 w
er
e 
ki
lle
d 
du
rin
g 
St
al
in
’s
 T
er
ro
r 
Pe
rp
et
ra
to
r  
 - 
 
St
al
in
 &
 S
ov
ie
t a
ut
ho
rit
ie
s 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t r
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
n 
co
nt
in
ue
 in
ve
sti
ng
 in
 c
om
m
em
or
at
iv
e 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 
re
m
em
be
r a
bo
ut
 th
e 
vi
ct
im
s 
Co
nn
ec
tio
n 
w
ith
 p
re
se
nt
 
co
m
m
em
or
at
io
n 
is 
fo
r t
he
 b
et
te
r 
pr
es
en
t &
 fu
tu
re
 o
f R
us
sia
 
 - 
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Appendix 5 (continued). 
 
  
Fr
am
e I
V
 (P
ar
t 2
) 
  
  
El
em
en
ts 
of
 th
e 
fra
m
e 
Te
xt
 1
3 
Te
xt
 1
4 
Th
em
e/
to
pi
c 
Th
e 
co
lle
ct
io
n 
of
 st
on
es
 fr
om
 m
em
or
ab
le
 
pl
ac
es
 is
 fi
ni
sh
ed
 
 T
he
 in
sta
lla
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
m
on
um
en
t "
W
al
l o
f 
so
rro
w
" h
as
 st
ar
te
d 
in
 M
os
co
w
 
Ca
us
al
 in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
M
on
um
en
t i
s c
ol
le
ct
ed
 fr
om
 st
on
es
 fr
om
 
di
ffe
re
nt
 re
gi
on
s o
f R
us
sia
  
th
e 
m
on
um
en
t h
as
 b
ee
n 
be
in
g 
se
pa
ra
te
d 
in
 
pa
rts
 in
 o
rd
er
 to
 b
e 
in
sta
lle
d 
V
ic
tim
 
re
pr
es
se
d 
pe
op
le
 
 - 
 
Pe
rp
et
ra
to
r  
 - 
 
 - 
 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t r
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
n 
 - 
 
 - 
 
Co
nn
ec
tio
n 
w
ith
 p
re
se
nt
 
 - 
 
 - 
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Appendix 5 (continued). 
 
  
Fr
am
e I
V
 (P
ar
t 3
) 
  
  
  
El
em
en
ts 
of
 th
e 
fra
m
e 
Te
xt
 1
5 
Te
xt
 1
6 
Te
xt
 1
7 
Th
em
e/
to
pi
c 
Th
e 
ex
hi
bi
tio
n 
"W
al
l o
f s
or
ro
w
" 
w
as
 o
pe
ne
d 
in
 M
ag
ad
an
 
O
pe
ni
ng
 o
f W
al
l o
f S
or
ro
w
 
m
em
or
ia
l t
o 
vi
ct
im
s o
f p
ol
iti
ca
l 
re
pr
es
sio
n 
M
us
co
vi
te
 h
as
 d
on
at
ed
 c
oi
ns
 fr
om
 
50
's 
an
d 
90
's 
Ca
us
al
 
in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
th
e 
ne
w
 e
xh
ib
iti
on
 in
 M
ag
ad
an
 is
 
im
po
rta
nt
 a
s t
he
 fi
rs
t m
on
um
en
t t
o 
vi
ct
im
s o
f r
ep
re
ss
io
ns
 w
as
 o
pe
ne
d 
he
re
 
co
m
m
em
or
at
io
n 
of
 re
pr
es
se
d 
vi
ct
im
s 
is 
ve
ry
 im
po
rta
nt
 fo
r t
he
 fu
tu
re
 
ge
ne
ra
tio
ns
 
th
e 
in
sta
la
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
m
on
um
en
t i
s 
w
id
el
y 
su
pp
or
te
d 
by
 p
eo
pl
e 
V
ic
tim
 
in
no
ce
nt
 p
eo
pl
e 
th
at
 w
er
e 
re
pr
es
se
d 
w
ho
le
 c
ou
nt
ry
 
re
pr
es
se
d 
pe
op
le
 
Pe
rp
et
ra
to
r  
 - 
 
 - 
 
 - 
 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
re
co
m
m
en
da
tio
n 
fu
nd
in
g 
of
 th
e 
ne
w
 m
on
um
en
t 
re
m
em
be
r a
nd
 b
e 
aw
ar
e 
of
 w
ha
t 
ha
pp
en
ed
 in
 th
e 
pa
st,
 b
ut
 n
ot
 
"s
et
tli
ng
 sc
or
es
" 
 - 
 
Co
nn
ec
tio
n 
w
ith
 
pr
es
en
t 
by
 h
el
pi
ng
 to
 fu
nd
 th
e 
m
on
um
en
t, 
ev
er
yo
ne
 c
an
 sh
ar
e 
th
e m
em
or
y 
of
 
in
no
ce
nt
 p
eo
pl
e 
th
at
 w
er
e 
af
fe
ct
ed
 
by
 re
pr
es
sio
ns
 
re
m
em
be
rin
g 
th
e 
tra
ge
dy
 o
f 
re
pr
es
sio
n 
w
ill
 h
el
p 
to
 b
ui
ld
 a
 n
ew
 
so
ci
et
y 
on
 v
al
ue
s o
f t
ru
st 
&
 st
ab
ili
ty
 
th
er
e 
is 
a 
po
pu
la
r r
eq
ue
st 
th
at
 c
om
es
 
fro
m
 b
el
ow
 to
 c
om
m
em
or
at
e 
th
e 
vi
ct
im
s 
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Appendix 6. 
Comparison of the Frames III & IV. 
 
 
El
em
en
ts 
of
 th
e 
fra
m
e 
Fr
am
e 
III
 
Fr
am
e 
IV
 
Th
em
e/
to
pi
c 
ne
w
 m
on
um
en
t i
s n
ot
 su
pp
or
te
d 
by
 e
ve
ry
on
e 
O
pe
ni
ng
 o
f W
al
l o
f S
or
ro
w
 m
em
or
ia
l t
o 
vi
ct
im
s 
of
 p
ol
iti
ca
l r
ep
re
ss
io
n 
Ca
us
al
 in
te
rp
re
ta
tio
n 
In
 m
od
er
n 
Ru
ss
ia
 p
eo
pl
e 
ar
e 
co
nt
in
ue
d 
be
in
g 
re
pr
es
se
d,
 th
us
 th
e 
ne
w
 m
on
um
en
t i
s h
yp
oc
ris
y 
Ru
ss
ia
n 
ci
tiz
en
s s
up
po
rt 
th
e 
m
on
um
en
t &
 
re
co
gn
ise
 th
e 
im
po
rta
nc
e 
of
 c
om
m
em
or
at
io
n 
V
ic
tim
 
po
lit
ic
al
ly
 re
pr
es
se
d 
pe
op
le
 in
 m
od
er
n 
Ru
ss
ia
 &
 
M
em
or
ia
l 
So
vi
et
 p
ol
iti
ca
lly
 re
pr
es
se
d 
pe
op
le
  
Pe
rp
et
ra
to
r  
Ru
ss
ia
n 
au
th
or
iti
es
 
 - 
 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t r
ec
om
m
en
da
tio
n 
do
 n
ot
 su
pp
or
t g
ov
er
nm
en
t's
 c
om
m
em
or
at
iv
e 
ac
tio
ns
  
co
m
m
em
or
at
e 
th
e 
vi
ct
im
s 
Co
nn
ec
tio
n 
w
ith
 p
re
se
nt
 
hu
m
an
 ri
gh
ts 
&
 fr
ee
do
m
s a
re
 c
on
tin
ue
d 
be
in
g 
vi
ol
at
ed
 
co
m
m
em
or
at
io
n 
is 
fo
r t
he
 b
et
te
r p
re
se
nt
 &
 fu
tu
re
 
of
 R
us
sia
 
 
